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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Children, impelled by curiosity, often play taking anything that falls into their 
hands apart. They soon realise that taking things apart is easier than putting them 
back together. Yet, they do not truly understand how things work until they are 
able to reassemble the pieces. In many democracies, authority is fragmented and 
elections take place at various political levels. Citizens elect not just national 
representatives, but also local, regional or supra-national ones. Traditional 
approaches in political science research have mainly addressed voting behaviour 
analysing elections by office type (Nicholson, 2005). National election results are 
typically explained by national issues, such as the state of the national economy, 
while the role of sub-national or supra-national factors is stressed to explain the 
results of sub-national or supra-national elections, respectively. Contests to elect 
representatives for different tiers of government are, so to say, taken apart. 
However, elections do not take place in isolation from each other. On the 
contrary, what happens in one specific arena certainly impacts electoral choices at 
lower or upper levels in the same country. It is beyond dispute, for example, that 
the electoral fate of state-wide parties in sub-national and supra-national elections 
is linked to their performance at the national level (Gschwend, 2008; Jeffery and 
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Hough, 2009; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2011; Amat, Jurado and León, 2012). 
In fact, a well-established stream of research in political science, the second-order 
election model, considers that sub-national and supra-national elections results are 
often determined by issues and events belonging to the first-order national arena 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980). It is only by taking these vertical dynamics into account, 
putting again the pieces of different electoral levels together, that one can start to 
get a complete picture about how democracy works in multi-level systems. 
The aim of this cumulative dissertation is to analyse how parties and voters have 
adapted to the challenges of multi-level politics, going beyond a single-level 
focus. Particular attention is paid to the territorial dimension of party competition, 
and the ‘contamination’ of sub-national and supra-national arenas with national 
issues. To this end, the three papers of this cumulative dissertation focus on 
different but interrelated aspects: How parties compete in political settings in 
which together with the socioeconomic left-right dimension, there is a salient 
centre-periphery cleavage? Do parties wilfully ‘contaminate’ regional elections 
with national-level issues? When are individuals more likely to take into account 
level-specific issues in second-order contests (i.e., local, regional and European 
elections)? 
The following pages of this introduction are devoted to elaborate on the overall 
relevance, and to summarize the three single contributions, integrating each article 
into the broad general context. It is not the intention of this introductory part to 
provide an extensive literature review. Given that this thesis is written as a 
cumulative work, each of the individual articles contains the review of the 
relevant literature. The three articles were conceived to be free-standing, that is, 
are meant to be read and understood independently. However, they cover related 
themes. Consequently, for those reading this complete dissertation, some 
redundancy among the three papers is inevitable. 
1.1 The territorial political animal 
There are at least three reasons to turn our attention towards the dynamics of 
multi-level politics. First, a significant impetus to the implementation of 
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decentralization reforms has spread all over the world during the last decades. 
Several countries have become federations since the end of the World Wide II, a 
fact that has led scholars to talk about a ‘federalist revolution’ and to proclaim 
‘the end of the statist epoch’ (Elazar, 1991). Today, there are about 25 federal 
countries across all five continents, representing at least 40 per cent of the world’s 
population. This figure rises to more than 70 per cent if the population from 
countries that are not formally federations but use some sort of federalist 
arrangement is included. 
Second, the authority of sub-national governments is on the rise. Sub-national 
governments around the world have gained influence over decision-making. A 
systematic study made in 42 democracies has shown that, over the past half 
century, there has been a steady increase in the powers of regional governments 
(Hooghe, Marks and Schakel, 2010). In fact, important policy domains for the 
quality of life of citizens, such as education or health care, are partially or totally 
managed by regional or even local authorities in many countries. 
Third, an increasing number of countries are being faced with autonomist or 
secessionist movements. In the European Union alone, there are at least 37 
stateless regions in which many inhabitants are demanding either greater 
autonomy or full independence from the nation-state. With few exceptions, 
regionalist aspirations —and parties representing them— have been present in the 
majority of the European Union member states
1
. 
And to look at the whole picture, power has not just been shifting from the nation-
state downwards to the regions or local authorities but also upwards to supra-
national institutions such as the European Union. In sum, the political animal 
described by Aristotle two millennia ago could be conceived nowadays as a 
territorial political animal. 
 
                                                            
1 Up to 40 regionalist parties from 17 EU Member States are currently part of the European Free 
Alliance (EFA), whose main goal is to defend the right to self-determination of stateless nations 
and regions in Europe. 
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1.2 Methodological nationalism: mind the (black-hole) gap 
Regardless of the importance of the processes of decentralization and 
Europeanization, we still know little about political parties, voters and elections at 
the sub-national and supra-national levels. The reason is that political science 
research has largely remained dominated by the so-called ‘methodological 
nationalism’ which is the tendency to choose the nation-state as the unit of 
analysis (Jeffery and Schakel, 2013). As a result, most research on elections is 
about national elections. 
This has an empirical counterpart: there is a gap, almost a black hole, in terms of 
existing data with which to measure the preferences of voters and, especially, of 
parties in sub-national and supra-national elections. Several scholars have readily 
recognized the need to re-focus our analyses. 
Thus, for example, Gschwend writes the following with regards to the lack of data 
to estimate parties’ policy positions in multi-level states: 
‘since parties do typically make the first move in dealing with various 
incentives in multi-level systems, a systematic analysis of party policy at 
the national, compared to the sub-national level … might supplement the 
individual-level data’ (Gschwend, 2008: 237). 
Likewise, Fabre and Swenden call for: 
‘stronger links between traditional areas of party and policy research and 
multi-level party research and for more comparative data collection on 
multi-level parties and policy positions’ (Fabre and Swenden, 2013: 342). 
And Jeffery urges the academic community: 
‘to confront and de-bunk one of the most pervasive, yet perhaps most 
misleading assumptions in postwar social science: that the nation-state and 
its institutions are the natural unit of analysis for social scientists’ (Jeffery, 
2010: 13). 
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1.3 Relevance: the problem of accountability in multi-level 
countries 
The literature on federalism has abundantly argued about how the nature of the 
relationship between electoral arenas contributes to or hinders democratic 
accountability without arriving at a definitive conclusion. An analysis of the 
evidence available in the discipline warned about the lack of progress in our 
understanding of the costs generated by political decentralization (Triesman, 
2007). 
The normative side of the argument in favour of federalism is well developed and 
dates back over two centuries ago, when Madison, Hamilton and Jay published 
‘The Federalist Papers’. It is widely believed that decentralization is good for 
democracy (Breton, 2000). Theoretically, one of the main reasons to support 
decentralization is to increase governmental efficiency and to enhance 
accountability and responsiveness bringing the government closer to the people 
(Gagnon, 1993). Nevertheless, previous empirical findings are not conclusive to 
support the claim that federalism or decentralization leads to more efficient policy 
making (Biela, Hennl and Kaiser, 2013) or improves the quality of democracy 
(Lane and Ersson, 2005). 
In a democracy, elections are the essential mechanism to hold politicians 
accountable (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, 1999). According to the literature on 
retrospective voting (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981), citizens evaluate the past 
performance of the government and punish or reward the party or parties in office 
accordingly when they go to the polls. Elected representatives, in turn, pursue the 
public interest because they anticipate that they will be judged on the basis of the 
outcomes of their policies. Yet, this requires ‘clarity of responsibility’, that is, 
voters should be able to discern who is responsible for what (Powell and Whitten, 
1993). By making the lines of responsibility less clear, multi-level governance 
may potentially pose a threat to this basic mechanism of electoral accountability 
(Cutler, 2004; Anderson, 2006). 
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The broader question of ‘contamination’ between electoral arenas has attracted the 
attention of scholars, who have used different names to refer to similar or related 
phenomena: spillover effects, coattails, electoral externalities. Particularly, 
contamination effects have been defined as ‘a situation where either voters or 
party elites determine their political behaviour on the basis of other arenas, rather 
than the specific arena being contested’ (Guinjoan, 2014: 19). Thus defined, 
contamination effects can go in any direction. It may be that developments in sub-
national and supra-national politics affect the behaviour of voters or parties in 
national elections. However, the literature it is far more concerned by the impact 
of national politics on lower and upper levels. 
The existence of ‘contamination’ between electoral arenas hinders democratic 
accountability. The problem arises from the fact that voters reward and punish 
national, not level-specific, politicians when casting their votes in sub-national 
and supra-national elections. Although there are some contradictory findings, the 
literature suggests that regional executives are not held responsible, for instance, 
for their economic performance. When casting their votes in regional elections, 
citizens bear in mind the national government’s economic outcomes (Gélineau 
and Bélanger, 2005; Rodden and Wibbels, 2011). Similarly, local elections are 
often considered to be just a ‘national referendum’ on the popularity of the 
country’s government or a ‘barometer’ to predict the results of the subsequent 
national elections (Curtice and Payne, 1991; Jérôme and Lewis-Beck, 1999). And 
the prevalent assumption is that elections to the European Parliament are used by 
voters to send a signal of (dis)satisfaction with the policies implemented by the 
national governments rather than to express their views on European politics (Reif 
and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; Van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 1996; Hix and 
Marsh, 2007; Hix and Marsh, 2011). 
When election results are determined by issues that are beyond the specific arena 
being contested, accountability does not work properly. This has real-world 
implications. If citizens do not hold representatives responsible for their actions, 
the latter would have no incentive to pursue the policy preferences of their 
constituencies. 
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1.4 The overlooked role of political parties 
By far, research exploring the relationship between electoral arenas has favoured 
the study of voting behaviour over the analysis of party strategies. By focusing on 
election results, and consequently on voters’ preferences, the literature has 
generally ignored the role of political parties in contributing to or hinder 
accountability in multi-level states. 
In contexts where political responsibilities are intertwined, policy-makers have an 
incentive to develop strategies of credit-claiming and blame-avoidance (Weaver, 
1986). One can expect that a party seeking re-election at any level will (1) try to 
evade political responsibility for a policy with negative results (passing the buck 
to another tier of government) and (2) attempt to take credit for policies with 
positive effects (regardless of who really implemented these policies). The 
consequences of opportunistic behaviour on the part of sub-national politicians are 
well known: fiscal indiscipline (Rodden, 2006), comparative grievance among 
territories that fuels autonomist or secessionist demands (Alonso, 2012) and 
programmatic heterogeneity that hampers national governments’ ability to 
implement a coherent agenda (Maddens and Libbrecht, 2009; Alonso and Gómez, 
2011). 
Party strategies are approached in the first and the second article of this 
dissertation (chapters 2 and 3) focusing on regional elections, and by a 
combination of the two most influential accounts of party competition: the spatial 
and saliency theories (Dolezal et al., 2014). The first theory, based on Downs 
(1957), interprets competition as party confrontation over the same issues. It 
predicts that parties, on a given policy dimension, would take the position that 
maximize its votes. However, strategies can also be defined in terms of saliency 
(Budge and Farlie, 1983). The key prediction of the saliency theory of electoral 
competition is that parties compete by highlighting those issues which ‘belong’ to 
them. Each party would emphasize those issues in which it has credibility and 
reputation advantage over its competitors (Meguid, 2008). Rather than mutually 
exclusive, spatial and saliency theories can be conceived as compatible (Alonso, 
2012; Rovny and Edwards, 2012; Elias et al., 2015). 
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1.5 Breaking through the individual’s side 
One of the most prominent frameworks to analyze the results of sub-national and 
supra-national elections is the second-order election model, which was formulated 
by Reif and Schmitt in 1980. According to this model, elections other than the 
national presidential or parliamentary elections are second-order contests, whose 
results can be read as a by-product of the national government popularity. The 
literature on second-order elections presumes that instead of holding accountable 
sub-national or supra-national representatives for their actions, citizens decide 
whether to vote and for whom in sub-national and supra-national elections on the 
grounds of issues belonging to the first-order national arena. 
The second-order election theory does not only ignore the role of political parties 
and their ability to wilfully subordinate one electoral arena to another in multi-
level countries. It is also paradoxical that the predictions of this theory have long 
remained at the aggregate level even if these predictions are built on assumptions 
about the behaviour of individuals. 
Only after three decades since its original formulation, scholars started to study 
the ‘micro-level foundations’ of the second-order election model (Schmitt, Sanz 
and Braun, 2008; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011). The third article of this dissertation 
(chapter 4) aims to contribute to these relatively recent efforts. To this end, 
instead of addressing party strategies in regional elections, like the previous two 
articles of this thesis, it turns to voter’s behaviour, and it expands the focus to 
include local and European elections. In the following section the three single 
contributions are summarized in more detail. 
1.6 Overview of the thesis 
This is a cumulative dissertation, comprising three articles. Two of them, co-
authored with Sonia Alonso (Georgetown University School of Foreign Service 
in Qatar) and Braulio Gómez (University of Deusto), have been published in the 
academic journals Party Politics and Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 
respectively. The third article is single-authored by the doctoral candidate and has 
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been submitted to the journal Electoral Studies, being under peer review at this 
journal at the moment of the submission of this dissertation. 
First article 
The first article, entitled ‘Parties’ Electoral Strategies in a Two-Dimensional 
Political Space: Evidence from Spain and Great Britain’ has been published in 
Party Politics as a part of the special issue ‘Position, selective emphasis and 
framing: Party competition in multinational democracies’, guest-edited by Anwen 
Elias, Edina Szöcsik and Christina Zuber. It is, in terms of content, an 
introductory piece for this dissertation. Methodologically, it tests the versatility of 
the data generated by the Regional Manifestos Project, that uses quantitative 
content analysis of electoral manifestos of political parties to estimate their policy 
positions and preferences in regional elections (see section 1.7 of this 
introduction). Substantially, it addresses how parties deal with left-right and 
centre-periphery issues in regional elections. 
The objective of this article, co-authored with Sonia Alonso and Braulio Gómez, 
is to test empirically the theoretical assumptions made by Elias, Szöcsik and 
Zuber (2015) about the repertoire of party strategies in a two-dimensional political 
space. In multi-level states, the policy space is characterized by the presence of 
two major dimensions of competition: the socioeconomic left-right and the 
territorial centre-periphery. Depending on the stances of the parties on these two 
dimensions, Elias and her colleagues define a repertoire of four party strategies: a 
uni-dimensional strategy, a blurring strategy, a subsuming strategy and a two-
dimensional strategy. How well these theoretically-derived strategies approximate 
what parties in a two-dimensional political space really do? Which parties are 
more likely to use what type of strategy? And under what circumstances? Spain 
and United Kingdom are selected as case studies. In both countries, devolution 
has been taking place in a relatively short time period and the regions have 
achieved a wide range of powers, giving raise to the emergence of successful 
regionalist parties. Therefore, the Spanish and the British cases are most likely 
cases for the presence of a two-dimensional political space. 
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Second article 
The second article entitles ‘How National Parties Nationalize Regional Elections: 
The Case of Spain’ is also co-authored by Sonia Alonso and Braulio Gómez, and 
it has been published in Publius: The Journal of Federalism. This article shows 
how state-wide parties contribute to the ‘contamination’ between electoral arenas 
in multi-level states. It is argued that regional branches of state-wide parties 
strategically (de)emphasize national-level responsibilities during regional election 
campaigns in order to win votes. Parties frame the regional campaign in national 
terms under two circumstances: when the co-partisans are in office at the national 
government in times of good performance, and when the co-partisans are in 
opposition and the national incumbent party is unpopular.  
The empirical evidence comes again from the Regional Manifestos Project, 
specifically from the quantitative content analysis of the regional party manifestos 
of the People’s Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 
between 1998 and 2012. The Spanish case is a quasi-experimental setting, in the 
sense that we have a period of economic boom immediately followed by a deep 
economic recession with national and regional elections taking place in-between. 
This article compares, then, how parties ‘nationalize’ regional elections during a 
period of economic growth and during an economic crisis. 
Third article 
The third article, ‘First-Order Thinking in Second-Order Contests: A Comparison 
of Local, Regional and European Elections’ shifts the focus from parties to voters, 
and adopts a broader perspective by incorporating not only regional but also local 
and European elections into the analysis. The aim of this article, single-authored 
by the doctoral candidate and under review at the journal Electoral Studies, is to 
analyse whether individuals consider issues belonging to the specific arena being 
contested in three types of the so-called second-order elections, and when they are 
more likely to do it. 
The empirical analysis is based on individual-level data from surveys conducted 
by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) after the Spanish local, 
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regional and European between 1999 and 2015. The CIS has systematically asked 
respondents in these surveys whether national or level-specific issues influence 
their voting choices in local, regional and European elections. Although this 
question represents very valuable information, it has been barely used for research 
purposes. Data from 59 different election surveys have been pooled into three 
datasets. In the first part of the article, descriptive evidence is reported about the 
proportion of citizens taking into consideration level-specific issues comparing 
local, regional and European elections, and how it changes across time. In the 
second part, logistic regressions are conducted to analyze when individuals are 
more likely to consider level-specific issues in second-order elections. 
1.7 Methodology: The Regional Manifestos Project 
The aim of this dissertation is not only to produce substantive conclusions but also 
to innovate methodologically. Party competition in multi-level states has been 
scarcely studied so far, due to the lack of available data. Most of this dissertation 
(the first and the second article) is based on a sophisticated method to measure the 
preferences of parties in regional elections based on quantitative content analysis 
of party manifestos. 
Although few people read them, election manifestos offer a unique view of 
political parties’ intentions and the image they choose to project to the electorate 
in order to attract votes. A great deal of literature has been written on the 
advantages of using election manifestos as the main source to obtain information 
on political parties’ positions and preferences (Alonso, Volkens and Gómez, 
2012). These advantages can be summarized as follows: 
1) Election manifestos are published by the parties’ official bodies and 
represent the position of the entire party, not only that of one person or 
faction; 
2) They are published regularly, for each election, allowing to detect shifts 
over time; 
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3) Manifestos generally cover a broad range of issues, which makes it 
possible to systematically compare within and across territories the 
different parties’ stances on these issues. 
4) We have enough empirical evidence about the fact that the parties, once in 
office, keep most of the electoral pledges contained in their manifestos
2
. 
The most used empirical reference in the study of parties’ policy positions and 
preferences based on election programs is the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(CMP/MARPOR). The CMP database offers data of more than 900 political 
parties in 56 countries since 1945. Nevertheless it has two major pitfalls if one 
pretends to analyze party competition in multi-level states. As all the large 
comparative projects studying representative democracies, it only covers national 
elections and does not provide data on regional manifestos. Moreover, its 
classification scheme is to crude to measure party positions on the centre-
periphery dimension. 
During the last seven years the doctoral candidate have collected, coded and 
analyzed regional election manifestos with the methodology developed by the 
Regional Manifestos Project (RMP), a research project funded by the Spanish 
Ministry of Economy and Competitiviness, under the coordination of Braulio 
Gómez and Sonia Alonso. 
The RMP has adapted the classification scheme of the CMP to multi-level states. 
The methodology is the same in both cases: the quantitative content analysis of 
parties’ manifestos. The text is divided into quasi-sentences which are coded into 
one policy category according to a classification scheme that covers a wide range 
of issues. Once all the text has been coded, the number of quasi-sentences that are 
dedicated to each policy category is computed and expressed as a percentage over 
the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto (saliency score). 
Apart from creating sub-categories that capture regional-level policy preferences, 
the main advantage of the RMP is that an additional code is added to each quasi-
                                                            
2 About the so named ‘program-to-policy linkage’, see for example Mansergh and Thomas (2007), 
‘Election Pledges, Party Competition, and Policymaking’, Comparative Politics 39(3): 311-329. 
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sentence in order to distinguish the level of government that it addresses (local, 
regional, national, European or international) and the preferences about the 
distribution of competencies/powers (more or less authority for the level of 
government mentioned). 
1.8 A note on the contribution of the doctoral candidate to the co-
authored articles 
This section describes the specific contribution of the doctoral candidate to the co-
authored articles ‘Parties’ Electoral Strategies in a Two-Dimensional Political 
Space: Evidence from Spain and Great Britain’ and ‘How National Parties 
Nationalize Regional Elections: The Case of Spain’. Both articles use data from 
the RMP, and were co-authored by the members of the research team of this 
project: the doctoral candidate, the coordinator Sonia Alonso, and the principal 
investigator Braulio Gómez. 
Regarding the dataset, the doctoral candidate, Braulio Gómez and Sonia Alonso 
contributed equally to the development of the coding scheme and instructions 
employed in the data production process of the RMP, departing from an initial 
idea of Braulio Gómez. The doctoral candidate was fully responsible of the 
collection, transformation into electronically codable versions and coding of the 
manifestos
3
. Likewise, the doctoral candidate was fully responsible of processing 
the coded texts, the computation of saliency scores and variables, and the creation 
and release of the dataset. 
Sonia Alonso elaborated a first preliminary draft of the article ‘Parties’ Electoral 
Strategies in a Two-Dimensional Political Space: Evidence from Spain and Great 
Britain’, with the support of the doctoral candidate and Braulio Gómez. The 
doctoral candidate prepared the data and conducted the empirical analysis. After 
submission to the journal Party Politics, the responsibility was transferred to the 
doctoral candidate, who led the revise and resubmit process and was on charge of 
the elaboration of the article in its final version. Following the suggestions made 
                                                            
3 A limited number of manifestos were coded by external collaborators of the Regional Manifestos 
Project under the supervision of the doctoral candidate. 
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by reviewers, the doctoral candidate re-elaborated the theoretical argumentation, 
conducted new analysis, and re-wrote the entire article, with the support of 
Braulio Gómez and Sonia Alonso. 
With regards to the second article encompassing this dissertation, ‘How National 
Parties Nationalize Regional Elections: The Case of Spain’, the doctoral candidate 
elaborated the theoretical argumentation with the support of Braulio Gómez and 
Sonia Alonso, prepared the data and conducted the empirical analysis. This article 
was based on an idea originally presented in a former conference paper in which 
the doctoral candidate, Sonia Alonso and Braulio Gómez contributed equally. 
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Chapter 2 
Parties’ Electoral Strategies in a Two-Dimensional 
Political Space: Evidence from Spain and Great 
Britain4 
 
(with Sonia Alonso and Braulio Gómez) 
 
 
Abstract 
This article has two objectives. Firstly, we test the theoretical assumptions about 
the repertoire of party strategies in a two-dimensional political space presented in 
the introduction to this special issue [Elias et al., 2015]. We use a new dataset that 
content-analyzes electoral parties’ manifestos for regional elections in Spain and 
Great Britain (the Regional Manifestos Project) in order to see how well the 
theoretically-derived strategies approximate what parties in regional elections 
really do. Secondly, we develop tentative explanations of parties’ strategies: 
Which parties are more likely to use what type of strategy and under what 
circumstances? After running a multinomial logistic model we find that, in 
contrast to the niche party thesis, regionalist parties strategize simultaneously 
along the territorial and the economic dimensions of competition, while state-wide 
parties react to the presence of regionalist opponents by incorporating the 
territorial dimension into the agenda. 
                                                            
4 This article is published in Party Politics (2015, Vol.21(6): 851-865) as a part of the special issue 
entitled ‘Position, selective emphasis and framing: Party Competition in multinational 
democracies’, guest-edited by Anwen Elias, Edina Szöcsik and Christina Zuber. 
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2.1 Introduction 
We know little about the behaviour of parties in a two-dimensional political 
space, for two main reasons. The first reason is the assumption, dominant in the 
field since Downs (1957), according to which mainstream parties subsume all 
issues, old and new, along an all-encompassing left-right dimension, and limit 
their strategies to movements along this dimension. This interpretation of party 
competition was later complemented by the notion of valence issues (Stokes, 
1963) and by the idea that parties also strategize by emphasizing issues, positional 
or valence, in which parties have a reputational or credibility advantage while 
ignoring issues for which these advantages do not exist (Budge and Farlie, 1983). 
Under this dominant perspective, competition between new or small parties and 
mainstream parties is seen as ‘competition between unequals’ (Meguid, 2008), 
whereby the issues raised by new or small parties (the so-called niche parties: 
green, extreme right-wing, regionalist, etc.) are either absorbed by mainstream 
parties and incorporated into the all-encompassing left-right dimension or 
monopolized by the small and new parties, which then become a stable 
component of the country’s party system. The second reason is, probably, the 
most difficult to tackle: there is a gap, almost a black hole, in terms of existing 
data with which to measure multidimensional political spaces across time, 
particularly with respect to the territorial dimension. It would not be exaggerated 
to say that the only cross-national time-series data with which to measure the 
position of parties along the centre-periphery continuum is the Manifesto Project, 
and it has two major weaknesses: it only measures national political spaces and its 
classification scheme is not detailed enough to capture the territorial dimension in 
all its complexity. 
In the introduction to this special issue [Elias et al., 2015], Elias, Szöcsik and 
Zuber (2015) have developed a theory of party strategies in a two-dimensional 
space in which the major dimensions of competition are the economic left-right 
and the territorial centre-periphery. This article focuses on the strategies of parties 
with regard to these dimensions in regional elections, which is the arena where the 
issues related to the territorial dimension gain particular relevance. Doing so, this 
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article addresses two overlooked aspects of party competition, namely the 
regional level and issues beyond the left-right dimension. Regional elections are 
usually neglected due to the tendency among political scientists to choose the 
national level as the unit of analysis. Competition along the issues of the territorial 
dimension is fundamental in decentralized countries with distinctive ethnic, 
cultural or linguistic populations and mobilized regionalist parties. 
This article has two objectives. First, we want to test the theory of the two-
dimensional political space and the repertoire of party strategies defined by Elias 
et al. (2015) in the introduction to this special issue [Elias et al., 2015]. Second, 
we advance some exploratory hypotheses concerning when and why parties 
choose which strategy. The first task requires that we develop empirical indicators 
of saliency, position and blurring along the economic and the territorial 
dimensions. We do so using a new dataset that content-analyses parties’ 
manifestos for regional elections in Spain (between 1980 and 2012) and Great 
Britain (2011), the Regional Manifestos Project (RMP).
5
 The reason for using 
RMP data is that, for the first time, it offers a fine-tuned measurement of the 
preferences of parties with regards to both the economic and the territorial 
dimensions in multi-level polities (Alonso et al., 2013). 
Our analyses demonstrate that the theoretically-derived strategies are a good 
description of what parties really do when they compete in regional elections in 
multinational states. In the sub-national political spaces of Spain and Great 
Britain, a territorial dimension co-exists with an economic dimension. 
Specifically, we have found that regionalist parties strategize along the two 
dimensions simultaneously, while state-wide parties incorporate the issues related 
with the territorial dimension in their manifestos when they face a regionalist 
contender. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents definitions of the main 
concepts guiding this research. Section 3 introduces the cases and the data. In 
section 4 we propose an operationalization of saliency, position and blurring along 
the territorial and the economic dimensions. In section 5 some descriptive results 
                                                            
5 For further information and data download please visit: www.regionalmanifestosproject.com. 
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are shown. Finally, we operationalize party strategies and test some tentative 
hypotheses: which parties, and under what circumstances, are more likely to use 
which strategy and why? We end the article with some concluding remarks about 
our findings and the research agenda opened up before us. 
2.2 The repertoire of party strategies in a two-dimensional 
political space 
2.2.1 The economic and the territorial dimensions 
In multinational democracies, in which the national constituencies are far from 
being uniform in terms of identity, the political space is susceptible to be defined 
by, at least, two major dimensions of competition: an economic dimension and a 
territorial dimension. To re-cap the discussion in the introduction to this special 
issue [Elias et al., 2015], the territorial centre-periphery dimension revolves 
around the dispute for political control over a – peripheral – territory inside the 
state. This dimension represents a conflict between the parties that want their 
peripheral territories to be autonomous (or even independent) in order to preserve 
their ‘national’ and/or ‘cultural’ distinctiveness and the parties that resist 
peripheral demands to defend the integrity of the state. We refer to the parties 
whose agenda is to defend the peripheral territory’s differentiation inside the state 
as ‘regionalist parties’ and to the (regional branches of) parties whose priority is 
to defend the interests of the state as ‘state-wide parties’. 
Regionalist parties, by definition, organize exclusively in their peripheral territory 
and present candidates to elections – state wide, regional or local – exclusively 
within it. State-wide parties, in contrast, organize throughout the geography of the 
state, presenting candidates to state-wide, regional and local elections in all 
constituencies – or nearly all. State-wide parties may have diverse positions along 
the centre-periphery dimension; regionalist parties’ preferences only move in one 
direction, the periphery (Alonso, 2012). However, within the ‘periphery side’ of 
the centre-periphery dimension, regionalist parties vary greatly in their more 
radical or moderate positions (De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Massetti, 2009). 
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The economic left-right dimension is associated with the preferences of parties 
regarding the role of the state in managing the economy. It can be defined as a 
continuum along which these preferences are ordered from those most favourable 
to the intervention of the government in the economy to those which prioritize a 
lean state and economic freedom.
6
 Parties on the economic right want less 
government intervention, lower taxes, less regulation and privatization of state 
assets. Parties on the economic left prefer an active role of the government in the 
economy, more regulation in order to reduce inequalities caused by the market 
and higher taxes. These meanings are widely shared across time and place (Elias 
et al., 2015; Marks et al., 2006: 156–157). 
2.2.2 The repertoire of party strategies 
Parties compete for votes by emphasising those issues in which they have 
credibility and reputational advantage over their competitors. These issues 
constitute the party’s primary dimension of competition. However, in two-
dimensional political spaces each party will also face a secondary dimension of 
competition. This dimension structures competition along a set of issues which are 
not a fundamental part of the party’s identity but which may become unavoidable 
for the party at particular elections, depending on the distribution of voters’ 
preferences and on the behaviour of the other parties (Alonso, 2012: 19). 
According to Elias et al. (2015), parties in a two-dimensional space combine 
saliency and position in both the primary and secondary dimensions to arrive at 
four main strategies. 
The first one is the one-dimensional strategy: ‘[P]arties position themselves, and 
give salience to, the dimension they are most invested in and that is associated 
with their core issues; at the same time they may dismiss the dimension that is of 
                                                            
6 In defining the left-right dimension in exclusively economic terms, we endorse the decision of 
Elias et al. (2015) to exclude the social dimension from the analysis. The social dimension is 
problematic not only because it seems to be independent of the economic dimension, as correlation 
analyses not shown here demonstrate, but also because there are no ‘social’ right-wing manifestos 
in our dataset. All the manifestos analysed here are left-leaning on social issues. Only economic 
issues differentiate between left-wing and right-wing positions. This confirms previous results by 
Benoit and Däubler (2014) at the national level, according to which the pro-welfare issue category 
‘contributes much less to separating left from right parties’ (Benoit and Däubler, 2014: 31). 
Welfare is, therefore, a valence issue, not a positional one. 
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secondary importance to them’ (Elias et al., 2015). For state-wide parties this 
strategy implies that they ignore territorial issues while they focus their political 
stands on their core economic issues. For regionalist parties, it means exactly the 
same, only in this case they ignore economic issues to concentrate on the centre-
periphery dimension. They signal their electoral strategies by moving along their 
respective primary dimensions of competition, by converging towards – or 
diverging from – the rival party’s position (Downs, 1957). 
In two-dimensional spaces, however, the presence of an economic and a territorial 
dimension allows parties to define their electoral moves not just on their primary 
dimension of competition, but by using strategic repositioning on the secondary 
dimension as well. The secondary dimension can be used as a complement – or 
compensatory mechanism – to the first. The use of salient positions 
simultaneously along the primary and secondary dimensions of competition is the 
two-dimensional strategy. This strategy also implies that the positions displayed 
along each dimension are not blurred but clear and consistent. 
The one-dimensional strategy is the default strategy for both state-wide and 
regionalist parties. Parties, however, are not rigid in their electoral moves and they 
will abandon their default strategy whenever a new competition scenario unfolds 
that makes an adaptation necessary. In this respect, we reject the idea that only 
mainstream (i.e. state-wide) parties react to changes in the competitive 
circumstances of the political system. Unlike those analyses that categorize 
regionalist parties as niche parties that have no incentive to move beyond their 
core territorial dimension (Adams et al., 2006; Meguid, 2008), we defend that 
regionalist parties do not limit their appeals to centre-periphery issues (Alonso, 
2012; Elias, 2009; Zuber, 2012). The decision to emphasize or downplay 
territorial issues with respect to other types of issues is a strategic one and 
depends on the structure of party competition in each particular context. This 
applies to state-wide and regionalist parties alike. There is no difference between 
regionalist and state-wide parties in their predispositions to act strategically. 
The third strategy is the blurring of positions along the secondary dimension. 
Parties, even when they want to concentrate on their core issues, ‘may not want to 
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ignore secondary issues completely’ (Elias et al., 2015) because these issues have 
become so salient in the political space that dismissing them would be risky in 
terms of vote shares. Therefore, they address these issues, which are of secondary 
importance to them, but in such a way that the position is ambiguous, or even 
contradictory, so as not to divide their electorate on their core issues (Rovny, 
2013). This strategy is facilitated by the fact that parties have more room for 
manoeuvre in their secondary dimension of competition than in their primary one. 
In the latter, lack of integrity or responsibility could be more severely punished 
(Alonso, 2012). 
The fourth and final strategy defined by Elias et al. (2015) consists in subsuming 
issues belonging to the secondary dimension into the parties’ primary dimension. 
The implication is, therefore, that parties will try to frame issues in core-
dimension terms (Basile, 2012; 2015). 
2.3 Data and cases 
Our analysis relies on data from the RMP, which content-analyses parties’ 
manifestos written for regional-level elections using a very similar methodology 
to the one developed by MARPOR
7
 (previously, Comparative Manifestos Project) 
for national elections. The text unit of analysis is the quasi-sentence. All the 
quasi-sentences of a manifesto are coded into one policy category (i.e. issue) 
according to a classification scheme which covers a wide range of policy fields. 
Once the whole manifesto has been coded, the number of quasi-sentences that are 
dedicated to each category is computed and expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto. 
MARPOR and the RMP share the same assumptions and methodology. However, 
whereas MARPOR was designed to analyse national manifestos, the RMP has 
adapted MARPOR’s methodology to multi-level polities. The main difference 
between MARPOR and the RMP is that the latter adapts the former’s national-
level classification scheme to sub-national elections by: (a) introducing an 
additional two-digit code that captures territorial preferences; and (b) creating 
                                                            
7 Manifesto Research on Party Representation: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/. 
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sub-categories to capture some issues that are particular of political competition in 
sub-national elections. The two-digit territorial codes, to be applied in each quasi-
sentence, identify the level of government – local, regional, national, European or 
international – and the preferences of parties regarding the distribution of powers 
(more or less authority to the addressed level of government in a given policy 
issue). 
Our analysis discusses evidence from Spain and Great Britain. These countries 
have been selected because they are the most likely cases for the presence of a 
two-dimensional political space. This is highly relevant for an article whose main 
objective is to serve as a theory-building tool; there would be little to explain in 
the absence of a two-dimensional space. There are three main reasons that make 
these two countries perfect candidates for the presence of two dimensions of party 
competition. First, they are characterized by heterogeneous populations in terms 
of history, language and culture. Second, they have undergone devolution 
reforms, leading to an increase of the autonomy of their regions. Third, some 
regionalist parties in these countries, especially in Catalonia, the Basque Country 
and Scotland, are among the most successful in Europe. This poses a particular 
challenge to state-wide parties which have to compete with regionalist parties in 
local, regional and national elections. In combination, these factors are likely to 
encourage the saliency of the territorial dimension in the political space. 
 
Table 1 
Number of cases 
Spain 
(17 Autonomous Communities) 
1980-2012 regional elections 
Great Britain 
(Scotland and Wales) 
2011 regional elections 
People’s Party 49 Conservative Party 2 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 50 Labour Party 2 
Regionalist parties 27 Regionalist parties 2 
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In Spain, the RMP data cover 17 Autonomous Communities and different 
electoral periods between 1980 and 2012, although, since the dataset is still 
incomplete, not all electoral periods are fully covered for all the regions (for a 
detailed list of cases, see Appendix). The Spanish parties included are the regional 
branches of the main state-wide parties, People’s Party (PP) and Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE), and the largest regionalist parties in each region. The 
British manifestos included are those belonging to the regional branches of the 
Labour Party and the Conservative Party, and the largest regionalist parties for the 
2011 regional elections in Scotland and Wales.
8
 
The total number of cases in the dataset is 132, 103 of which are state-wide 
parties’ manifestos and 29 of which are regionalist parties’ manifestos (Table 1). 
To tackle the problem of having an unbalanced sample of Spanish and British 
parties, we show all the results disaggregated by country and, in the final 
statistical model, we include a dummy variable for Great Britain in order to avoid 
the results being totally driven by the much more numerous group of parties from 
Spain.  
2.4 Operationalizing saliency, position and blurring 
Our first step is to operationalize both the economic and the territorial dimensions 
in order to measure the saliency and position of parties, as well as the extent to 
which the position is clear and coherent throughout the manifesto. To do so, we 
select the content-analysis categories that, according to our definitions, constitute 
each dimension. A detailed list of the categories belonging to each dimension can 
be found in the Appendix. 
The saliency of the territorial dimension is calculated as the percentage of quasi-
sentences in a manifesto assigned to ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ categories. The 
calculation of the saliency of the economic dimension follows exactly the same 
procedure with the issues that belong to economic ‘left’ and ‘right’. Theoretically, 
                                                            
8 Manual coding of party manifestos is an extremely time-consuming task. We do not include (or 
randomly select) the universe of political parties in regional elections in Spain and Great Britain. 
Therefore, this article is limited in the generality of its results. 
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the saliency of any given dimension thus calculated ranges from 0, for a party 
manifesto that completely ignores the dimension, to 100, for a party manifesto 
that dedicates all its sentences to the issues of the dimension. 
The position of parties along the different dimensions is computed following the 
‘standard’ procedure (Budge, 2013) employed by MARPOR, that is, by 
subtracting the percentages belonging to opposite categories. These scales order 
the parties’ positions along two continuums from economic left to economic right 
and from centre to periphery, theoretically ranging from –100, for a manifesto 
exclusively dedicated to pro-centre (or economic left-wing) arguments, to 100, for 
a manifesto totally devoted to pro-periphery (or economic right-wing) arguments.
9
 
The position scores so obtained do not simply reflect the relative weight of pro-
centre (or economic right-wing) categories with respect to pro-periphery (or 
economic left-wing) ones, but are also influenced by the total content of the 
manifesto (i.e. its size), given that the two terms of the formula are the 
aggregation of saliency scores. For example, if a party dedicates 20 sentences to 
periphery issues and 50 sentences to centre ones in a manifesto made up of 100 
sentences, the position of that party on the centre-periphery scale would be –30 
(20% – 50%). If the same party increased the size of the manifesto by adding 
another 100 sentences not related to the territorial dimension, its position in this 
scale would increase to –15 (10% – 25%) although the absolute quantity of centre 
and periphery statements would have remained equal. The same applies to the 
economic dimension. 
Alternative measures have been proposed to solve this problem. For instance, Kim 
and Fording (2002) estimate the position of parties on the left-right scale using in 
the denominator the total number of right and left sentences, instead of the total 
number of sentences of the manifesto. Lowe et al. (2011) lean towards a scaling 
method based on log odds-ratios. Nevertheless, we opt here for computing 
                                                            
9 One can get a zero positional score in two very different situations: when parties place 
themselves in the centre of the dimension (pro- and con-sentences cancel each other out) and when 
parties do not discuss the issues at all (saliency = 0). In order to avoid collapsing these two 
situations in one, we calculate the positional score conditional on the saliency scores being greater 
than 0. 
Chapter 2     29 
 
 
 
positional scores following the standard approach. There are three reasons 
justifying our choice. First, the standard method is already appropriate for the 
purposes of this article. A party that devotes only a few sentences to express its 
position along the centre-periphery dimension should not have the same position 
score as a party that devotes half of the manifesto to the issues belonging to this 
cleavage. Second, some reasons have been pointed out for not using the 
alternative scales as standard measures of the position of parties. According to 
Budge (2013), the method proposed by Kim and Fording has the effect of ‘forcing 
the scores to the extremes’, while the logit ratio scale implies a ‘rather arbitrary 
data assumption in place of a data fact’ (Budge, 2013: 6). Third, and probably the 
most convincing argument, in our dataset the correlation between the standard 
economic left-right scale and both alternative methods is higher than 0.9. For the 
centre-periphery dimension, the correlation between the standard and the logit 
ratio scale is also very high (0.88). With regard to the proposal by Kim and 
Fording the correlation is lower (0.43) but still significant and in the correct 
direction. Consequently, it can be safely assumed that the choice of one or another 
scaling method will not have a large effect on the results. 
Finally, we measure positional blurring as the simultaneous presence of pro- and 
con-arguments over the same issue. Just as important as assessing the position of 
the parties, is to measure the extent in which these positions are clearly conveyed. 
A party may have different reasons to portray ambiguous or contradictory 
messages (Lo et al., 2016). A blurred position may be useful to accommodate 
internal divergent preferences of party factions or to strategically attract voters 
with different viewpoints. The idea here is that a manifesto that is clear and 
consistent in its position should not include simultaneously opposite categories 
(i.e. sentences both in favour and against a particular policy issue). Manifestos, 
however, are seldom totally consistent. In order to measure how much blurring a 
manifesto conveys in each dimension of competition we subtract pro- and con-
arguments (i.e. periphery and centre, or economic left and right) and then we 
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divide this figure in absolute values by the total number of quasi-sentences 
assigned to the dimension.
10
 
This variable ranges from 1, for a completely clear position (no mixture of centre 
and periphery arguments, or economic right and left ones), to 0, for a completely 
blurred position. Since it takes into account the total salience of pro- and con-
sentences in the denominator, it tells us nothing about how important the issue is 
for the party;
11
 it only reflects the extent to which pro- and con-sentences are 
mixed in a manifesto. Table 2 summarizes all the formulas. 
 
Table 2 
Operationalization of saliency, position and blurring along the two dimensions 
 Territorial dimension Economic dimension Theoretical range 
Saliency       
   
 
       
   
 
 From 0 to 100 
Position       
   
 
       
   
 
 From -100 to 100 
Blurring       
     
   
       
     
   
 From 0 to 1 
 
Where: 
P = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘periphery’ categories 
C = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘centre’ categories 
R = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘economic right’ categories 
L = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘economic left’ categories 
N = Total number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto 
 
                                                            
10 This operationalization of ‘blurring’ has two limitations: (1) it covers only partially the 
phenomenon as described in the introduction of this volume (Elias et al., 2015), addressing only 
one aspect (i.e. contradictory positions), but not the others (vagueness and ambiguity) and (2) it 
may be difficult to distinguish it from a moderate position. 
11 A party manifesto can have a score of 1 (total consistency) with a low saliency score as well as 
with a high saliency score. 
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2.5 Mapping the preferences of political parties 
Before moving towards the explanatory analysis of party strategies, we present a 
description of saliency, position and blurring of Spanish and British parties along 
the two dimensions of competition. We take into account the type of party 
according to the territorial orientation (regionalist or state-wide) and, for the latter, 
the competitive situation in the region (presence or absence of regionalist 
contenders). This last distinction only applies to the Spanish regions because in 
Scotland and Wales state-wide parties always face competition from regionalist 
parties. 
2.5.1 Saliency 
We interpret saliency scores in relative terms rather than absolute ones, looking at 
the relative weight of territorial issues vis-à-vis economic ones. To do so we have 
computed a ratio between the saliency of the two dimensions of political 
competition. The greater than 1 the ratio, the more relevant is the economic 
dimension relative to the territorial dimension; the lower than 1, the more relevant 
the territorial dimension. A value of 1 indicates that both dimensions are equally 
relevant. 
Both in Spain and Great Britain, the ratio is below 1 for regionalist parties, and 
well above 3 for state-wide parties (Table 3). This is exactly what we should find 
if our hypothesis about the existence of a primary and a secondary dimension 
were true. The data show that the territorial dimension is the primary dimension 
for regionalist parties whereas the economic dimension is the primary dimension 
for state-wide parties. Furthermore, for the Spanish case, there are also differences 
between state-wide parties depending on the regional competitive situation. The 
existence of peripheral opponents in the region (i.e. regionalist parties) encourages 
state-wide parties to give salience to the territorial dimension. This fact can be 
linked to the idea of ‘party-system agenda’ developed by Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen (2010; 2015). According to this concept, parties not only address 
issues in which they have a competitive advantage over their rivals, but also must 
respond to the issues that other parties emphasize. Thus, the territorial dimension 
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receives the attention of state-wide parties in party systems with the presence of 
relevant regionalist parties. 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics of saliency of the economic and territorial dimensions 
 Territorial dimension * Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 12.49 5.72 2.69 23.28 
 SWP facing regionalist 72 3.44 2.58 0.00 14.47 
 SWP not facing reg. 27 2.53 1.98 0.00 6.64 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 10.41 4.48 7.24 13.58 
SWP facing regionalist 4 3.75 3.75 .78 9.17 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 Economic dimension Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 7.11 3.45 2.74 17.12 
 SWP facing regionalist 72 7.97 3.59 .90 18.57 
 SWP not facing reg. 27 8.91 3.42 2.90 18.40 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 5.98 1.14 5.17 6.79 
SWP facing regionalist 4 8.35 4.14 3.11 13.21 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 Ratio * Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 .77 .81 .20 4.33 
 SWP facing regionalist 71 3.63 3.33 .30 19.67 
 SWP not facing reg. 25 5.62 4.87 1.26 21.40 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 .61 .15 .50 .71 
SWP facing regionalist 4 5.93 7.61 .89 17.00 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 
* Statistically significant at .01 level (One-way ANOVA) 
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Table 3 also shows that, even if territorial issues constitute the core issues of 
regionalist parties, the economic dimension is also very relevant for them. In fact, 
the differences in the saliency of the economic dimension by type of party are not 
statistically significant. Regionalist parties give as much emphasis as state-wide 
parties to economic issues. This speaks against the niche party thesis and proves 
correct our intuition that regionalist parties in fact engage in a two-dimensional 
strategy. We will have the opportunity to test this hypothesis later on, when we 
move on to the exploratory analysis of the strategies of parties. 
2.5.2 Position 
Unsurprisingly, the position of regionalist parties in the territorial dimension is, by 
far, much more pro-periphery than the position of state-wide parties (Table 4). 
More interesting is the fact that there is a lot of variation in the position of state-
wide parties, particularly among those which face a regionalist challenger. In the 
Spanish case, their position score in the territorial dimension ranges from –3.87 (a 
pro-centre position) to 14.04 (a pro-periphery position). 
With regard to the position along the economic dimension, Table 4 shows that 
there are not statistically significant differences between regionalist and state-wide 
parties. Indeed, regionalist parties in Spain show as heterogeneous preferences as 
state-wide parties regarding the role of the state in the economy. In Great Britain 
both regionalist parties, the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru, have an 
economic left-wing manifesto. 
We can look more closely at the position of the parties in the economic and the 
territorial dimensions in Figure 1. These three graphs show how parties are spread 
along the two-dimensional political space. We have drawn a linear trendline in 
each graph to see whether the positions along the economic and the territorial 
dimensions are related to each other. 
Regionalist parties are spread not only along the territorial dimension (according 
to the intensity of their peripheral demands), but also along the economic one 
(Figure 1.1). Unlike previous research that concludes that the radicalism of the 
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secessionist demands among regionalist parties is associated with left-wing 
positions (Massetti and Schakel, 2014), our data suggest that this relationship does 
not exist. Regionalist parties in the Spanish regions can be found anywhere along 
the economic dimension. In Great Britain, as we have already observed in Table 
3, both regionalist parties are placed on the left side of the economic scale. 
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics of position along the economic and territorial dimensions 
 Territorial dimension * Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 12.30 5.81 2.69 22.78 
 SWP facing regionalist 71 2.51 2.57 -3.87 14.04 
 SWP not facing reg. 25 2.22 1.89 -.05 5.87 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 10.41 4.48 7.24 13.58 
SWP facing regionalist 4 3.64 3.55 .78 8.75 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 Economic dimension Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 -.90 4.62 -17.12 7.10 
 SWP facing regionalist 72 1.23 3.31 -4.98 12.62 
 SWP not facing reg. 27 .67 4.36 -5.48 12.24 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 -1.54 1.88 -2.87 -.21 
SWP facing regionalist 4 1.92 5.59 -3.27 9.59 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 
** Statistically significant at .01 level (One-way ANOVA) 
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Figure 1 
Position of parties along the economic and the territorial dimensions 
 
 
2.5.3 Blurring 
Parties’ positions are not as clear along the economic dimension of competition as 
we had expected (Table 5). Regionalist parties blur less along their primary 
dimension of competition, the territorial dimension, than along their secondary 
one, the economic dimension. Nevertheless, the same is true for state-wide 
parties. They also blur more along the economic dimension than along the 
territorial one. In fact, there are not statistically significant differences between 
state-wide and regionalist parties in their tendency to blur along the economic 
dimension. Irrespective of the type of party, they show on average high levels of 
blurring in their economic preferences. By contrast, parties blur little along the 
territorial dimension of competition, especially if they are regionalist parties. To 
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sum up the findings in Table 5, we can say that, across the board, there is more 
economic blurring than blurring along the territorial dimension. Parties show clear 
centre-periphery positions while tending to blur their economic stances. 
 
Table 5 
Summary statistics of blurring along the economic and territorial dimensions 
 Territorial dimension * Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 .97 .07 .75 1.00 
 SWP facing regionalist 71 .80 .25 .09 1.00 
 SWP not facing reg. 25 .78 .29 .09 1.00 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
SWP facing regionalist 4 .99 .02 .95 1.00 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 Economic dimension Observ. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Spain Regionalist parties 27 .36 .28 .03 1.00 
 SWP facing regionalist 72 .31 .24 .01 1.00 
 SWP not facing reg. 27 .35 .29 .00 1.00 
Great 
Britain 
Regionalist parties 2 .23 .27 .04 .42 
SWP facing regionalist 4 .42 .21 .28 .73 
 SWP not facing reg. - - - - - 
 
** Statistically significant at .01 level (One-way ANOVA) 
 
 
2.6 Explaining parties’ strategies in a two-dimensional space 
2.6.1 Operationalizing party strategies 
We have constructed a categorical variable which compiles the different strategies 
of the parties by merging saliency and positional blurring on the economic and the 
territorial dimensions. The possible values for this variable are 1 (one-dimensional 
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strategy), 2 (two-dimensional strategy) and 3 (blurring strategy). We have defined 
the one-dimensional strategy as the one by which the party emphasizes 
exclusively or mostly issues from its primary dimension of competition, while the 
secondary dimension is ignored. Hence, the variable takes the value 1 under two 
situations: a) when a regionalist party gives saliency mainly to the territorial 
dimension setting aside the economic dimension, and b) when a state-wide party 
emphasizes the economic dimension pushing the territorial dimension into the 
background. The two-dimensional strategy is defined as that which consists in 
emphasizing issues from the party’s primary and secondary dimensions 
simultaneously. Hence, the variable takes the value 2 if a party clearly defines its 
position along the economic and the territorial scales, giving importance to both 
dimensions. Finally, the variable takes the value 3 whenever a) a regionalist party 
tends to adopt a blurred position along the economic dimension, or b) a state-wide 
party does the same along the territorial dimension.
12
 Unfortunately, our data 
cannot measure framing in the way it has been defined in Elias et al. (2015) 
because it is a rhetorical strategy that cannot be captured by our classification 
scheme. 
According to this variable, most of the Spanish and British parties analysed here 
adopt a two-dimensional strategy (52%), nearly 29% ignore the secondary 
dimension of competition carrying out a one-dimensional strategy and the 
remaining 19% opt for the blurring strategy. In the next section we examine which 
parties are more likely to use what type of strategy and when. 
2.6.2 An exploratory analysis 
This section is an exploratory exercise to generate hypotheses for future research. 
Based on the parties’ expected behaviour along their primary and secondary 
dimensions of competition, we will now test some predictors commonly used to 
explain party strategies in the literature on party competition and territorial 
                                                            
12 The following benchmarks are chosen: we consider that a party is blurring its position on its 
secondary dimension if our indicator blurring as defined in section 4 is below 0.5; we consider that 
a party emphasizes both dimensions when the proportion between the dimensions is at least 20–80 
and there is no blurring in the secondary dimension; we consider that a party sets aside a 
dimension when this proportion is not reached. The categories are mutually exclusive. 
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politics (Alonso and Gómez, 2011; Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Massetti, 2009; 
Meguid, 2008; Swenden and Maddens, 2009). We believe some of these variables 
could also explain under what circumstances parties are more likely to use one or 
another of the three hypothesized strategies. We do a pooled data analysis, thereby 
ignoring the panel structure of our data (cross section-time-series), because we 
still lack the complete dataset.
13
 The independent variables that we use for the 
regression model are the following: 
(1) Type of party according to the territorial orientation and competitive 
situation, made up of three categories: 1 (regionalist parties), 2 (state-wide 
parties that compete with relevant regionalist parties) and 3 (state-wide 
parties that do not compete with relevant regionalist parties).
14
 We create 
two dummy variables for 1 and 2. The reference category is 3. 
(2) Type of party according to the economic orientation (with value 0 for left-
wing parties and 1 for right-wing parties).
15
 
(3) Incumbency (with value 1 if the party was in government at the time of 
writing the manifesto and 0 otherwise). 
(4) Party’s vote gain/loss with respect to the previous election (calculated as 
the difference between the percentage of vote at time t and the percentage 
of vote at time t–1). 
(5) The economic situation measured by the regional unemployment rate. 
(6) A dummy variable for the Spanish historical regions, which are also those 
regions in which the regional elections are not held simultaneously. 
(7) A dummy variable for the parties from Great Britain. 
(8) The strength of regionalist parties in the region measured as their number 
of seats in the regional assembly (only relevant for state-wide parties 
facing regionalist contenders). 
                                                            
13 The implication is that the regression analysis’ assumption about the absence of autocorrelation 
among the independent variables might be violated. 
14 A relevant regionalist party is defined as one that has obtained at least once since 1980 a seat in 
the regional 
parliament. 
15 Right parties are the Spanish PP, the British Conservatives and, among regionalist parties, CIU, 
PNV, CC, PAR, PRC and PR. Left parties are the PSOE, Labour and, among regionalist parties, 
ERC, CUP, EHB, BNG, AGE, SNP and PC. See Appendix for acronyms. 
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The dependent variable is the one described in section 6.1. As this variable is 
categorical and has more than two values, we perform a multinomial logistic 
regression. We set the reference category in the first value (one-dimensional 
strategy), comparing therefore the other two categories with it. We run two 
models. In the first model we include the independent variables from (1) to (7). In 
the second model we add the independent variable (8) as an interaction with the 
dummy variable for the group of state-wide parties facing regionalist contenders. 
We do this to check whether the strength of regionalist parties, and not just their 
presence, influences the strategic behaviour of state-wide parties. The results are 
shown in Table 6. 
Of all the independent variables introduced in the analysis, only the type of party 
according to the territorial orientation, the type of party according to the 
ideological orientation and the control variable indicating whether the region is an 
historical one seem to predict which strategy is adopted. Neither the economic 
situation nor the incumbency status or the party’s electoral gain/loss is a good 
predictor. 
With regard to the type of party according to the economic orientation, the slope 
is significant and positive for the blurring strategy in the first model. This implies 
that the relative probability of adopting a blurring strategy rather than a one-
dimensional strategy is higher for right-wing parties than for left-wing parties. 
Competing in a historical region increases the party’s likelihood of following both 
the two-dimensional and the blurring strategies instead of the one-dimensional 
strategy. Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities of choosing each strategy by 
type of party according to the territorial orientation. 
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Table 6 
Multinomial logistic regression models for Parties’ strategies 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Two-dim Blurring Two-dim. Blurring 
Vote gain/loss 0.064 
(0.04) 
-0.025 
(0.06) 
0.056 
(0.04) 
-0.011 
(0.07) 
Unemployment rate -0.045 
(0.04) 
-0.021 
(0.06) 
-0.050 
(0.04) 
-0.013 
(0.06) 
Type of party (territorial)     
   Regionalist 2.075 
(1.28) 
3.437** 
(1.38) 
3.661 
(2.32) 
5.150** 
(2.31) 
   SWP facing regionalist 1.428** 
(0.61) 
-0.080 
(1.05) 
1.816*** 
(0.66) 
-0.393 
(1.20) 
   SWP not facing reg. (ref.) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Type of party (ideological)     
   Right-wing -0.812 
(0.54) 
1.515* 
(0.86) 
-0.847 
(0.55) 
1.411 
(0.87) 
   Left-wing (ref.) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Incumbency 0.320 
(0.52) 
0.421 
(0.78) 
0.163 
(0.54) 
0.498 
(0.81) 
Historical region 2.582** 
(1.09) 
3.171** 
(1.24) 
4.312** 
(1.74) 
4.347** 
(1.89) 
Great Britain -1.614 
(1.21) 
1.114 
(1.46) 
-0.089 
(1.66) 
2.157 
(1.96) 
Seats regionalist parties - - -0.072 
(0.05) 
-0.069 
(0.05) 
Seats regionalist parties × 
SWP facing regionalist 
- - 0.028 
(0.04) 
0.062 
(0.05) 
Intercept 0.187 
(0.79) 
-2.773* 
(1.43) 
0.344 
(0.80) 
-2.866 
(1.52) 
N 114  114  
Missing cases 18  18  
Pseudo R² 0.3106  0.3411  
 
***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). 
Dependent variable: Strategies of parties = (1) One-dimensional strategy (category of 
reference); (2) Two-dimensional strategy; (3) Blurring strategy 
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According to our results, regionalist parties are more likely to opt for the blurring 
strategy. The probability of pursuing a two-dimensional strategy is higher for 
state-wide parties that face a regionalist party. In this regard, the strength of 
regionalist parties, measured as the number of seats in the regional assembly, does 
not make a difference.
16
 The interaction in model 2 is not statistically significant. 
The probability of state-wide parties pursuing one or another strategy is 
influenced by the presence of regionalist parties but not by the number of seats 
that the latter hold in the regional parliament. In the absence of such a contender, 
state-wide parties are more likely to opt for the one-dimensional strategy. 
 
Figure 2 
Predicted probabilities of parties’ strategies (with 95% CI) 
 
Note: Predicted from the multinomial logistic regression results in Table 6 (Model 1) 
                                                            
16 We have run a third model selecting the state-wide parties and replacing the variable (1) type of 
party (territorial orientation) by the variable (8) number of seats of regionalist parties. We obtained 
the same result. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
This article had two main objectives. The first was to test the theory about the 
repertoire of party strategies in a two-dimensional political space. The second was 
to develop some tentative explanations of the circumstances in which the parties 
use one or another strategy. We conclude with a summary of what we have found, 
highlighting some possible directions for a new research agenda based on these 
findings. 
First, we have confirmed the co-existence of a territorial and an economic 
dimension in the sub-national political spaces of Spain and Great Britain in which 
there are relevant regionalist parties competing for votes with state-wide parties. 
In regions without a peripheral challenger, the territorial dimension is dominated 
by the economic one. We have also confirmed the existence of a primary and a 
secondary dimension of competition for all the parties in the dataset, defined by 
their core and secondary issues respectively. For regionalist parties, the primary 
dimension of competition is the territorial one; for state-wide parties, it is the 
economic dimension. 
Second, we have developed empirical indicators for measuring saliency, position 
and the extent of blurring along the economic and, most importantly, along the 
territorial dimension. This has allowed us to construct a variable that reflects three 
of the four strategies defined in the introduction to this volume (Elias et al., 2015). 
We have found that these theoretically-derived strategies are a good description of 
what parties really do. Parties engage in one-dimensional, two-dimensional and 
blurring strategies as measured by our developed indicators. The parties’ strategic 
choice depends mainly on the type of party according to the territorial orientation. 
Regionalist parties engage mostly in blurring and two-dimensional strategies. 
They blur less along their primary dimension of competition, the territorial 
dimension, than along their secondary one, the economic dimension, and they do 
not use the one-dimensional strategy. Therefore, regionalist parties behave as 
predicted: against the niche party thesis, regionalist parties strategize along the 
two dimensions simultaneously. 
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State-wide parties behave according to the competitive situation in the region. 
This means that regionalist parties not only shape directly the space of political 
competition by raising ‘new’ issues and conforming to a bi-dimensional space, but 
also influence the behaviour and the agenda of state-wide parties, which in some 
circumstances are compelled not to neglect the territorial dimension. State-wide 
parties use the two-dimensional strategy more often when they face a regionalist 
challenger in the regional arena. It remains an open question whether this finding 
applies to the national level. Does the presence of regionalist parties in national 
elections automatically make state-wide parties pay attention to the territorial 
dimension? According to the RMP data, state-wide parties give more saliency to 
the issues belonging to the territorial dimension in regional manifestos than in 
national ones. This suggests that in national elections state-wide parties may 
respond in a different way to the presence of regionalist opponents. Nevertheless, 
only future research can answer this question. 
The type of party according to the ideological orientation also matters for 
explaining which strategy is preferred in regional elections. Right-wing parties are 
more likely to adopt a blurring strategy. We attribute this result to the fact that the 
Spanish and British conservative parties, due to their centralist tradition, may have 
more difficulties to accommodate their proposals to the regional arena without 
contravening the identity of their national branch. On the one hand, they have a 
consolidated reputation as preservers of the national cohesion and territorial unity, 
which plays against the credibility of their autonomist proposals. On the other, to 
defend a pro-centre position on regions whose citizens have a dual national 
identity and/or a distinctive culture or language may not be the better option for 
running a regional election. Therefore, blurring along the territorial dimension of 
competition appears to be an appropriate alternative. 
Finally, parties that compete in a historical region are more likely to give salience 
to the territorial dimension and to engage, therefore, in blurring and two-
dimensional strategies. However, the party’s vote gains and losses do not affect 
the probability of choosing one or another strategy. Our results also suggest that 
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the economic situation of the region does not have any influence on the parties’ 
strategies in a two-dimensional political space. 
We have found no other predictors that could explain better the strategies under 
analysis. The reason is probably that we lack the complete dataset and, therefore, 
the incapacity to do a panel cross-section-time-series data analysis. The lack of 
effect of parties’ electoral performance is, nevertheless, striking. We believe that 
we need a more subtle measure of electoral gains and losses. Parties that behave 
strategically pay close attention to where their vote gains come from and where 
their vote losses go to in order to define their electoral strategies. Therefore, we 
need to measure not just vote gains and losses but movements of votes between 
parties. This will be the task of future research efforts. 
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2.9 Annex 
The RMP Categories of the Territorial and the Economic Dimensions 
Territorial Dimension (Based on Alonso et al., 2013): 
 RMP Coding Number Definition 
Centre C32_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 32 
code (i.e. more competencies for the central state) 
 C21_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 21 
code (i.e. fewer compet. for the peripheral territory) 
 C30_(601, 6015, 6016, 608) Promotion of [state] nation-building policies 
 C20_602 Statements against peripheral nationalism or 
regionalism. 
 C20_302  +  C30_302 General statements against decentralization. In 
favour of (re-)centralisation at the state level. 
Periphery C22_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 22 
code (i.e. more compet. for the peripheral territory) 
 C31_YYY(Y) All policy preference categories that come with a 31 
code (i.e. fewer competencies for the central state) 
 C20_(601, 6015, 6016, 608) Promotion of [regional] nation-building policies 
 C30_602 Statements against state nationalism or against the 
existing nation-state. 
 C20_(301, 3013, 3014) + 
C30_301 
General statements in favour of decentralisation at 
the regional level. 
 
Economic Dimension (Based on Laver and Budge, 1992): 
 
RMP Coding 
Number 
Definition 
Left CXX_403 Market regulation (any level of government) 
 CXX_404 Economic planning (any level of government) 
 CXX_406 Protectionism: positive (any level of government) 
 CXX_412 Controlled economy (any level of government) 
 CXX_413 Nationalization (any level of government) 
Right CXX_401 Free enterprise (any level of government) 
 CXX_402 Incentives (any level of government) 
 CXX_407 Protectionism: negative (any level of government) 
 CXX_414 Economic orthodoxy (any level of government) 
 
Further definitions of each code can be found in the RMP Codebook: 
http://www.regionalmanifestosproject.com/ 
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AN 4             X X  X X  
AR 5           X  X   X X X 
AS 8  X  X         X X  2 2  
IB 4              X  X X X 
 PV 14   X  X X   X X X X X X X X X 2 
 CN 6             X X X X X X 
 CB 12 X    X X X X X    X X X X X X 
 CM 9 X X  X X  X X     X X   X  
 CL 7  X   X   X     X X  X X  
 CT 13   2   X   X X   X X X X X 3 
 EX 8 X X   X   X     X X  X X  
 GA 10 X   X   X      X X X X X 2 
 RI 4              X  X X X 
 MD 6 X X           X X  X X  
 MC 5    X         X X  X X  
 NA 5             X X  X X X 
 VC 6 X   X         X X  X X  
   
            
   C
O
N
 
L
A
B
 
R
eg
. 
G
B 
SCT 3                X X X 
WLS 3                X X X 
Asturias held regional elections in 2011 and in 2012. Until 2007, Navarrese People’s Union (UPN) 
acted as the regional branch of the PP in Navarra, in 2011 they run regional elections separately. 
Abbreviations: ES Spain, AN Andalusia, AR Aragon, AS Asturias, IB Balearic Islands, CN 
Canary Islands, CT Catalonia, CB Cantabria, CL Castile and Leon, CM Castile-La Mancha, EX 
Extremadura, GA Galicia, LR La Rioja, MD Community of Madrid, MC Community of Murcia, 
NC Community of Navarra, PV Basque Country, VC Valencian Community, GB Great Britain, 
SCT Scotland, WLS Wales. 
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Political Parties in the Dataset: 
State-wide parties (regional branches) 
Spain:   - People’s Party; People’s Alliance (PP;AP) 
- Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) 
Great Britain:  - Conservative Party (CON) 
- Labour Party (LAB) 
 
Regionalist parties 
Spain:  AR: - Aragonese Party (PAR) 
IB: - Socialist Party of Majorca-Iniciativa-Verds-ENTESA (PSM-IV-ExM) 
CB: - Regionalist Party of Cantabria (PRC) 
CN: - Canarian Coalition (CC) 
CT: - Convergence and Union (CiU) 
   - Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) 
   - Popular Unity Candidates (CUP) 
PV: - Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) 
   - Basque Country Unite (EHB) 
GA: - Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) 
   - Galician Alternative of the Left (AGE)                    
RI: - Riojan Party (PR) 
NC: - Navarrese People’s Union (UPN) 
Great Britain: SCT: - Scottish National Party (SNP) 
WLS: - Plaid Cymru (PC) 
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Chapter 3 
How National Parties Nationalize Regional 
Elections: The Case of Spain17 
 
(with Sonia Alonso and Braulio Gómez) 
 
 
Abstract 
This article demonstrates that regional branches of national parties do not limit 
regional election campaigns to regional issues. On the contrary, they nationalize 
regional elections (i.e., emphasize national-level issues in regional campaigns) as 
an electoral strategy to win votes. The empirical evidence comes from the 
quantitative content analysis of regional-level manifestos of the two main national 
parties in Spain, PP, and PSOE, between 1998 and 2015. The percentage of 
references to the national government is taken as an indicator of nationalization. 
We find that parties nationalize regional elections under two situations: when the 
national co-partisans are in office enjoying high levels of popularity or when the 
national co-partisans are in opposition and the nationally governing party is 
unpopular. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the role of 
national parties in subordinating the regional arena to the national one in federal 
and decentralized states. 
 
                                                            
17 This article is published in Publius: The Journal of Federalism (2017), 47(1): 77-98. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Multi-level governance creates a perfect breeding ground for the subordination of 
sub-national – and supra-national – levels to the national political arena 
(Gschwend, 2008). In a complex institutional setting where the competences for 
major public policies are split between different levels of government, the ability 
of citizens to correctly attribute political responsibilities can be undermined 
(Anderson, 2006; León, 2012). Many studies in several European countries as 
well as in the United States, Canada, or Argentina show that citizens often take 
their cues from national government performance and from national party 
behavior to vote in regional elections (Gélineau and Remmer, 2006; Hough and 
Jeffery, 2006; Jeffery and Hough, 2009; Kedar, 2006; Lago-Peñas and Lago-
Peñas, 2012; Rogers, 2013; Schleicher, 2016). If the behavior of voters in regional 
elections is determined by national factors, dual accountability, allegedly the 
primary source of federalism’s beneficial effects, does not work as expected 
(Rodden and Wibbels, 2011). In such a situation, citizens decide whether to vote 
and for whom in regional elections on the basis of national issues instead of 
holding regional representatives accountable for regional policy outcomes. The 
subordination of sub-national – and supra-national – electoral arenas to the 
national one has received different names in the literature: electoral 
contamination, coattails, national electoral externalities, spill-over effects, 
nationalization. Most scholars analysing this phenomenon rely on either aggregate 
data of election results or, to a lesser extent, individual survey data (i.e., voters’ 
electoral behavior). The ability of political parties to wilfully subordinate one 
electoral arena to another has been mostly overlooked. 
Previous research based on party behavior suggests that issue salience in regional 
and national campaigns depends on the delimitation of government competences: 
parties address national policies in national elections while regional elections are 
mainly dominated by issues of regional competence (Pogorelis et al., 2005). 
However, this article shows how national parties strategically emphasize and 
deemphasize national-level responsibilities during regional election campaigns in 
order to win votes. Although secondary, the presence of national issues in regional 
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campaigns varies between elections and across time within the same region, that 
is, even when the division of competences among the different levels of 
government remains stable. This article argues that nationalizing (or not 
nationalizing) regional elections is a strategic decision by parties that seek to 
obtain electoral gains by increasing or decreasing the degree of ‘second-
orderness’ of regional elections. National parties are presumably aware of the role 
played by the evaluation of national politics in their success or failure in regional 
elections and design the electoral strategies accordingly (Stecker, 2015). To 
nationalize a regional campaign means here to frame the regional level of 
government as a second-order arena, encouraging voters to think about parties’ 
performance at the national level when casting their votes in regional elections. 
The extent to which the strategy of nationalization is used depends on the 
incentives of the parties to transform regional elections into a plebiscite about the 
performance of, and satisfaction with, the national government. 
In order to test our argument, we use data from the content analysis of regional 
manifestos of the two main Spanish national parties, the Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP), between 1998 and 2015. 
By focusing on a single case like Spain, a large multi-level state with seventeen 
regions, this article aims to contribute to current debates within a comparative 
literature that has generally lacked a systematic account of the mechanisms that 
explain the linkage between regional and national arenas in decentralized and 
federal states beyond voters’ capacity to distinguish competences across levels of 
government. 
3.2 Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses 
The concept of nationalization has been developed in two different ways in 
political science, horizontal and vertical. The horizontal aspect of nationalization, 
which measures the nationalization of parties and party systems (Caramani, 2004; 
Chhibber and Kollman, 1998; Cox, 1997), has been much more widely researched 
than the vertical one. According to some scholars, nationalization describes the 
degree of homogeneity of parties’ vote shares across electoral districts in a 
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national election. There is a nationalized party system when the distribution of the 
vote is uniform across electoral districts. Different measures of party systems’ 
nationalization have been proposed (for an overview see Bochsler, 2010). None of 
these indicators, however, are useful to analyse party competition in multi-level 
settings, whether conceptually or empirically. 
The vertical view of nationalization, which focuses precisely on multi-level party 
competition, has been developed only recently. This approach understands 
nationalization as the extent to which national factors influence the results of 
regional elections (Rodden and Wibbels, 2011). A common way to measure 
nationalization of regional elections from this perspective is to calculate 
dissimilarity indexes between electoral results at the national and regional levels 
(Schakel, 2013a). A party system is nationalized when regional electoral 
outcomes are similar to national ones. 
One of the most prominent theories linked to the nationalization of regional 
elections is the second-order election model. Higher levels of nationalization 
would indicate that regional elections are considered by voters and parties as a 
second-order arena, secondary in relevance to the national electoral arena. 
Second-order elections are elections in which there is less at stake compared to 
first-order elections. For this reason, they are characterized by lower voter turnout, 
electoral losses by the regional co-partisans of the national incumbent and 
electoral gains by smaller parties as a result of a larger incidence of protest or 
expressive votes (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). According to previous 
research, the degree of subordination of regional elections to the national arena is 
determined by factors such as the level of self-government enjoyed by the region, 
the strength of the centre-periphery cleavage, or the election timing with respect to 
the national election cycle (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013; Hough and Jeffery, 2006; 
Jeffery and Hough, 2009; León, 2014; Kedar, 2006; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 
2012; Rodden and Wibbels, 2011; Schakel, 2013b). 
Existing research on nationalization of regional elections privileges voting 
behavior over party strategy. The reason lies in the fact that vertical 
nationalization is generally seen as the result of particular institutional designs 
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that encourage certain types of voting behavior. However, several authors have 
readily admitted the need to re-focus our analyses in order to understand the role 
of parties’ electoral strategies in the subordination of regional elections to the 
national arena (Gschwend, 2008; Rodden and Wibbels, 2011). We need to analyze 
the nationalization of regional elections from the point of view of parties’ 
strategies. After all, how voters decide their vote depends, among other things, on 
the way parties influence voters’ decisions through strategies of priming and 
framing during the electoral campaign (Petrocik, 1996). Much of the allocation of 
responsibility in multi-level states is based on strategies of credit-claiming and 
blame-avoidance by parties in government and in opposition (Volden, 2005). 
National parties want to maximize votes in regional elections as much as in 
national elections. When preparing their campaigns national parties have to decide 
which issues and issue dimensions have to be emphasized in each electoral arena. 
The nationalization of regional elections is a readily available, and easy to 
implement, strategy to reap electoral benefits in the region from decisions taken at 
the center. To nationalize a regional campaign means to frame the regional arena 
as a second-order election, encouraging voters to think about parties’ performance 
at the national level when casting their votes in the regional election. One way to 
nationalize a regional campaign is to emphasize policy issues that address national 
level responsibilities, leaving aside regional concerns or emphasizing them to a 
lesser degree. Another way is to make very salient a critical evaluation of the 
competitor’s performance at the national level, or to highlight the good results of 
the national co-partisans. Yet another way is to increase the presence and 
participation of national leaders in regional campaign events. Notice that, thus 
defined, nationalization is less about policy positions than it is about issue 
salience. The second-order hypothesis has nothing to say about the positions of 
national parties in regional elections; according to this theory, the policy issues 
discussed during the regional campaigns address topics and interests that are quite 
parochial and, by implication, the positions taken by national parties in these 
second-order elections will vary to the extent that regional circumstances and 
contexts vary across territories. What matters is the salience given to national 
issues and national government performance in the regional electoral campaigns. 
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Regional branches of the national incumbent party have incentives to nationalize 
regional elections when the economy is going well or when, despite an 
unimpressive economic performance, the national government is, for whatever 
reason (domestic or foreign policy successes unrelated to the economy), popular 
with the voters. When they are unpopular or under-performing at the national 
level, they will limit the regional campaign to regional issues so that their 
unpopularity or bad performance will not adversely affect their electoral prospects 
at the regional level. 
Table 1 
Expected behaviour of national parties in regional elections 
 
Economic growth and 
popular national 
incumbent 
Economic crisis and 
unpopular national 
incumbent 
Party in office (national) ↑ Nationalization ↓ Nationalization 
Party in opposition (national) ↓ Nationalization  ↑ Nationalization 
 
Concerning the regional branches of the national opposition party, the reverse 
applies. They have incentives to nationalize regional elections when the national 
incumbent is under-performing or unpopular or when the economy is going badly. 
Thus, the regional branches of the national opposition transform the regional 
campaign into a plebiscite on the national incumbent competitor. When the 
national incumbent is popular, the regional branches of the national opposition 
have no incentive to nationalize the regional campaigns. The expected strategies 
of parties in regional elections are illustrated in table 1. 
Our argument is condensed in the following hypothesis: 
H1.1: An increase in the national government’s popularity, a good national 
economic performance or a combination of both is associated with an increase 
in the use of the strategy of nationalization of regional elections by the party in 
office at the national level. 
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H1.2: An increase in the national government’s popularity, a good national 
economic performance or a combination of both is associated with a decrease 
in the use of the strategy of nationalization of regional elections by the party in 
the opposition at the national level. 
We assume that, irrespective of the parties’ level of internal centralization and 
regardless of the divergence in policy positions across regional branches, national 
parties have incentives to act in a coordinated way when designing their campaign 
strategies in regional elections. The decision to use the strategy of nationalization 
in a regional election could be initiated by the national or by the regional 
organizations but we assume that is shared by the party as a whole. 
There are some factors that can affect the hypothesized disposition of national 
parties to implement the strategy of nationalization of regional elections. First, in 
countries in which there is a salient territorial dimension of party competition 
(Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber, 2015), parties may use the nationalization of a regional 
campaign to signal their preference for centralization, or recentralization, of 
government powers, irrespective of their incumbency status and the performance 
of the national government. The party label would be the mechanism that explains 
this behavior, as it sets limits on what the parties can do if they want to preserve 
their reputation. We expect that national parties that support decentralization will 
nationalize regional elections to a lesser extent than more pro-centralist or 
unionist parties, which will use the strategy of nationalization of regional elections 
more often. 
Second, national parties can have fewer incentives to use the strategy of 
nationalization in those regions in which the level of self-government is higher or 
where there is a differentiated cultural, historical or linguistic identity among the 
population. In these regions, the electoral fate of national parties in regional 
elections is less dependent on the performance of the party at the national level 
(Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). The adaptation of political messages and policy 
programs to the regional particularities of these territories leads to a more 
differentiated regional agenda with respect to the national one. If wider sub-
national powers are accompanied by the presence of strong regionalist parties that 
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focus the debate on regional issues, the incentives for the regional branches of 
national parties to follow independent and regionally based electoral strategies are 
expected to be even higher. 
Finally, we expect that parties will use the strategy of nationalization more often 
when regional elections are held on the same date as national elections. Previous 
research has shown that vertical simultaneity reduces the autonomy of regional 
branches of national parties (Deschouwer, 2006) and increases the influence of the 
national arena in regional electoral results (Schakel and Dandoy, 2014). In 
addition, concurrence of regional and national elections may facilitate the 
development of coordinated election campaigns, giving room to a more natural 
presence of national issues and actors in the regional campaign. 
3.3 Cases and Data: Nationalizing Regional Elections in Spain 
3.3.1 Case Selection 
To test our hypotheses, we analyze the strategies of the two main national parties, 
the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the People’s Party (PP), in a 
series of regional elections held in Spain between October 1998 and May 2015. 
The Spanish case is a quasi-experimental setting, in the sense that we have a 
period of economic growth and high levels of government popularity immediately 
followed by a deep economic recession and a negative evaluation of the 
government’s performance, with national and regional elections taking place in-
between. Four waves of regional elections are selected for each region.
18
 This 
allows us to compare the behavior of the regional branches of national parties 
under opposite political and economic conditions and different circumstances of 
incumbency at the national level (table 2). Regional elections in Spain are held 
simultaneously in thirteen out of the seventeen regions that make up the country, 
while the remaining four regions (Andalusia, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and 
Galicia) have their own electoral calendar. 
                                                            
18 Since no regional elections took place during the period 2009–2011 in Andalusia, only three 
waves of regional elections are included for this region. 
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Table 2 
Elections included in the analysis and contextual information 
Period Years Party in 
office 
(national) 
Average 
national 
government 
evaluation 
(% good - % 
bad) 
Average 
annual 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Regional elections 
included in the analysis 
Economic 
growth and 
positive 
national 
governmt. 
evaluation 
1998-01 PP 
(Partido 
Popular) 
+24 4.5 1998 (25 Oct.): PV 
1999 (13 Jun.): AR, 
AS, IB, CN, CB, CL, 
CM, EX, LR, MD, 
MC, NC, VC 
1999 (17 Oct.): CT 
2000 (12 Mar.): AN 
2001 (21 Oct.): GA 
2005-08 PSOE 
(Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español) 
+8 3.2 2005 (17 Apr.): PV 
2005 (19 Jun.): GA 
2006 (1 Nov.): CT 
2007 (27 May): AR, 
AS, IB, CN, CB, CL, 
CM, EX, LR, MD, 
MC, NC, VC 
2008 (9 Mar.): AN 
Economic 
crisis and 
negative 
national 
governmt. 
evaluation 
2009-11 PSOE 
(Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español) 
-41 -1.5 2009 (1 Mar.): GA, PV 
2010 (28 Nov.): CT 
2011 (22 May): AR, 
AS, IB, CN, CB, CL, 
CM, EX, LR, MD, 
MC, NC, VC 
2012-15 PP 
(Partido 
Popular) 
-54 0.07 2012 (25 Mar.): AN, 
AS 
2012 (21 Oct.): GA, 
PV 
2012 (25 Nov.): CT 
2015 (24 May): AR, 
IB, CN, CB, CL, CM, 
EX, LR, MD, MC, NC, 
VC 
 
Abbreviations: AN Andalusia, AR Aragon, AS Asturias, IB Balearic Islands, CN Canary Islands, 
CT Catalonia, CB Cantabria, CL Castile and Leon, CM Castile-La Mancha, EX Extremadura, GA 
Galicia, LR La Rioja, MD Community of Madrid, MC Community of Murcia, NC Community of 
Navarra, PV Basque Country, VC Valencian Community 
 
Given that one of our main goals is to test the effect of national incumbency, we 
focus on the two Spanish national parties that have been in office. For more than 
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30 years, PSOE and PP have dominated the national political arena in Spain and 
successive national governments have been formed by these two parties since 
1982. PSOE ruled until 1996, and between 2004 and 2011, whereas PP formed the 
Spanish government from 1996 to 2004, and, again, since 2011. In average, 
during the whole period analyzed here, their combined vote share in regional 
elections has always been above 50 percent. We end up with a total of 134 
observations. 
3.3.2 Opposite Electoral Contexts and Preliminary Qualitative 
Evidence 
The different waves of regional elections in Spain covered by this article were 
held under very different circumstances. Regional elections taking place between 
1998 and 2001 were held under the incumbency of the PP at the national level. In 
1996, the PP won the Spanish elections for the first time and took office after 
fourteen consecutive years of PSOE-led national governments. During the first 
legislature of the conservative government, the evolution of the main 
macroeconomic indicators was positive, the high unemployment rate of the 
previous period was falling and Spain met the convergence criteria for joining the 
European monetary union and adopting the Euro. This good economic 
performance was reflected in the famous slogan ‘‘Spain is going well’’ (España 
va bien) coined by Prime Minister José María Aznar, whose popularity was on the 
rise, and repeated once and again during the regional election campaigns. 
Regional elections held between 2005 and the beginning of 2008 also took place 
during an exceptional period for the Spanish economy. The unemployment rate 
was the lowest in the democratic era (7.9 percent), but this time the national 
incumbent party was the PSOE. The presence of Prime Minister José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero in the different events of the regional campaigns was constant 
and he tried to improve the electoral prospects of its regional co-partisans by 
talking about the good economic results of the national government, which was 
enjoying high levels of popularity. At the presentation of the framework program 
for the 2007 local and regional elections, he declared: ‘what is at stake in the next 
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[local and regional] elections is the implementation of legislation promoted and 
designed by this [national] Government... We all know that our economy is 
growing at a rate above the EU average, above that of Japan, but what matters is 
that such prosperity reaches everyone...’ (Diario Hoy, 15 April 2007). 
In the period 2009–2011, the situation was totally reversed. The PSOE, re-elected 
to office in 2008, was presiding over an economy in recession and the popularity 
of the government had vanished. The unemployment rate was above 20 percent; 
the GDP growth rate had dropped from 3.8 percent in 2007 to –1.0 percent in 
2011. In this context, the PP designed a campaign aimed at turning the regional 
elections into a plebiscite over the national government’s performance, making 
constant references to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The PSOE tried to avoid it 
by focusing on regional-level issues. We find confirmation of these strategies in 
the explanation that the national organization of the PSOE gave to justify the 
suspension of its traditional pre-campaign opening meeting in Vista Alegre, 
Madrid: ‘Vista Alegre implies an enormous effort that we prefer to redirect to the 
territorial events and this decision fits in our electoral strategy that is to focus on 
the local and regional elections, against the strategy of the PP to transform the 22 
of May in a first round of the general election’’ (Europa Press, 9 March 2011). 
After the defeat of the PSOE in the Spanish general election of 2011, regional 
elections were held during the period 2012-2015 under the national incumbency 
of the PP and the ongoing economic and financial crisis. 
3.3.3 A Quantitative Indicator of the Strategy of Nationalization Based 
on Election Manifestos 
All extant indicators used to measure the level of nationalization of regional 
elections are based on electoral results or, to a lesser extent, on individual survey 
data and, therefore, on voters’ electoral behavior. The most common way to 
operationalize this concept is to quantify parties’ vote gains and losses between 
national and regional elections. Some scholars propose a very simple model where 
the dependent variable is the parties’ vote share in regional elections and the 
independent variable is the parties’ vote share in national elections (Amat, Jurado 
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and León, 2012; León, 2014). Most studies use synthetic measures of congruence 
of the vote, such as dissimilarity indexes between the results of regional and 
national elections (Schakel, 2013b; Dandoy and Schakel, 2013). The idea behind 
this approach is the following: regional elections are less influenced by national 
factors the more their results deviate from national election results. In any case, 
parties’ strategies remain outside the scope of analysis. 
To our knowledge, the only exceptions to this are Pogorelis et al. (2005), who 
used data from regional and national election manifestos in UK to analyze 
whether issue saliency depends or not on the actual division of powers between 
levels of government, and Stecker (2015), who used a variety of regional 
documents (manifestos, coalition agreements, and legislative initiatives) to study 
how the regional branches of national parties in Germany address national-level 
policies to signal their preferences about first-order issues over which they have 
little influence. 
The empirical evidence of this article comes from the Regional Manifestos Project 
(RMP) dataset (Gómez, Alonso and Cabeza, 2009). The RMP has collected, 
coded, and analyzed regional election manifestos, adapting the classification 
scheme of the Manifesto Project (which only covers national election programs) 
to multi-level states (i.e., decentralized states with different tiers of government). 
The methodology is the same in both projects: the quantitative content analysis of 
parties’ manifestos.19 The text is divided into quasi-sentences which are coded 
into one policy category according to a classification scheme that covers a wide 
range of issues. Once all the text has been coded, the number of quasi-sentences 
that are dedicated to each policy category is computed and expressed as a 
percentage over the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto (saliency 
score). The main advantage of the RMP is that an additional code is added to each 
quasi-sentence in order to distinguish the level of government that it addresses 
(local, regional, national, European, or international) and the preferred degree of 
authority for that level (more/less competences for the level of government 
                                                            
19 For further information about the RMP’s methodology see Alonso, Gómez, and Cabeza (2013). 
The data file is available from www.regionalmanifestosproject.com. 
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mentioned or status quo). The two codes are separated by a hyphen, so they can 
be analyzed together or separately.
20
 
In order to measure the strategy of nationalization of regional elections, we use 
the saliency score of code 30 (followed by any one of the 76 policy issue codes). 
This code captures the percentage of, quasi-sentences that are devoted to talk 
about the national level of government – no matter the specific policy issue – in 
regional manifestos. In other words, it means that the policy issue addressed by 
the quasi-sentence is framed in national terms. Whether the mentions to the 
national level are negative (to be expected when the co-partisans are in opposition 
at the national level), positive (to be expected when the co-partisans are in office 
at the national level) or neutral is irrelevant here. As stated in our hypothesis, a 
party has an incentive to nationalize regional elections either in order to benefit 
from the popularity of the co-partisans in office at the national level or to damage 
the electoral prospects of the regional branches of the national incumbent party. 
What matters is that the level of government addressed is the national one, which 
in the RMP’s coding scheme is captured by code 30. In order to avoid potential 
bias in our indicator due to punctual increases in the salience of the territorial 
debate (for example, in the 2010 and 2012 Catalan elections), the small number of 
quasi-sentences in which the party claims explicitly for recentralization (code 31) 
or for decentralization (code 32) are excluded. This means that the quasi-
sentences included in this indicator are simply connecting particular policy 
preferences to the national level of government, accepting the territorial status quo 
(i.e. the existing distribution of competences between the levels of government). 
Thus, this indicator does not necessarily reflect the position of the party along the 
territorial centre-periphery dimension. 
Although few people read them, election manifestos offer a unique view of 
political parties’ intentions and the image they choose to project to the voters. A 
great deal of literature has stressed the advantages of using election manifestos as 
the main source to analyze the preferences of political parties (Alonso, Gómez and 
                                                            
20 When election manifestos are not available, we use as a proxy the speeches in the presidential 
investiture debate (debate de investidura), in which the candidates for the regional presidency 
present their political programmes. 
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Volkens, 2012). Even if no voter takes electoral manifestos into account when 
deciding which party to vote for, they are a good proxy of the contents of the 
electoral campaigns. Increasing the amount of references to the national level of 
government in regional manifestos is, therefore, an indirect indicator of a party’s 
electoral strategy of nationalization. 
This indicator has a clear advantage compared to the few previous measurements 
of the disposition of parties to address national level policies in regional elections 
using manifestos. Scholars tend to divide a priori, on a case-by-case basis, the 
different policy domains (education, economic development, agriculture, etc.) into 
either regional or national-level responsibilities in order to compare the relative 
saliency of the two levels (see, for example, Pogorelis et al., 2005, who propose a 
list of issues to reflect the division of competences between the central and 
regional governments in UK). The problem with this approach is that it is hard to 
find policies provided and implemented exclusively by one level of government in 
decentralized states. Usually, there are shared powers between national and 
regional governments or, at least, some degree of overlapping responsibilities 
even if the competences are clearly distributed. For instance, in the Spanish case 
education is a regional-level issue but there is still a national Ministry of 
Education that sets general educational policy. Our indicator has the advantage 
that it is not based on the existing distribution of policy competences across the 
levels of government but on parties’ direct references to the national level of 
government in regional manifestos. 
3.4 Results 
In this section, we shall first present a descriptive analysis of how the use of the 
strategy of nationalization by the regional branches of national parties varies 
according to national incumbency and national government’s performance. We 
then move on to a regression analysis. 
For the empirical analysis, the data are first split into two periods: from 1998 to 
2008, the years of economic growth and positive evaluations of the national 
government’s performance, and from 2009 to 2015, the years of the Great 
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Recession in Spain and low levels of the national government’s popularity. In the 
first period the annual GDP growth rate was positive. The net difference between 
the number of citizens that evaluated as good or very good the performance of the 
national government and those who said that it was bad or very bad was also 
positive; citizens were on the whole satisfied with national government’s 
performance. In the second period, the GDP growth rate was negative or close to 
0 and the net citizens’ satisfaction with government’s performance was negative 
(table 2). Then, we divide these two periods into two sub-samples: manifestos 
written while the national co-partisans are in office and in opposition. 
Table 3 
Mean nationalization of regional elections by region 
REGION 
Party in office (national) Party in opposition (national) 
Economic 
growth and 
positive 
national 
government 
evaluation 
Economic 
crisis and 
negative 
national 
government 
evaluation Diff.  
Economic 
growth and 
positive 
national 
government 
evaluation 
Economic 
crisis and 
negative 
national 
government 
evaluation Diff. 
Andalusia 3,52 2.39 -1.13 2.91 2.20 -0.71 
Aragon 0,40 1.97 1.58 0.26 3.80 3.54 
Asturias 6,10 1.65 -4.45 0.58 2.38 1.80 
Balearic Islands 0,59 1.11 0.52 0.31 1.31 1.00 
Canary Islands 3,45 0.18 -3.27 0.95 1.99 1.04 
Cantabria 2,47 0.97 -1.51 0.49 2.28 1.79 
Castile and Leon 0,61 1.85 1.24 2.24 2.94 0.69 
C..-La Mancha 1,70 0.42 -1.29 1.94 7.15 5.21 
Catalonia 2,53 1.41 -1.13 2.97 2.65 -0.31 
Extremadura 3,29 0.36 -2.94 1.36 0.9 -0.47 
Galicia 1,31 0.82 -0.49 1.44 0.71 -0.73 
La Rioja 2,18 2.6 0.42 1.04 2.06 1.02 
Madrid 1,87 1.06 -0.81 1.96 1.53 -0.42 
Murcia 0,89 0.49 -0.4 0.83 4.4 3.58 
Navarra 3,73 0.67 -3.06 1.45 0.36 -1.09 
Basque Country 1,46 0.97 -0.48 0.93 0.90 -0.03 
Valencia 1,30 0.59 -0.72 1.07 1.15 0.08 
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Table 3 shows the mean percentage of sentences addressing the national level of 
government in regional manifestos under opposite circumstances disaggregated by 
region. Let us remember that the higher the number of direct mentions to the 
national level of government in a regional manifesto, the more the party is trying 
to frame the regional election in national, not regional, terms. According to our 
hypothesis, an economic crisis or the deterioration of national government’s 
popularity will foster the use of the strategy of nationalization by the regional 
branches of the national opposition party. Therefore, in table 3, we expect positive 
values in the last column (this is the case in thirteen out of the seventeen Spanish 
regions or 76 percent of the time). In contrast, the effect will be the opposite for 
the regional branches of the national incumbent. Thus, negative values are 
expected in the fourth column of table 3 (this is confirmed in ten out of seventeen 
regions or 59 percent of the time). 
Figure 1 
Mean nationalization of regional elections 
 
Chapter 3     67 
 
 
 
In figure 1, we plot the mean level of nationalization of regional elections. The 
data show that the references to the national level of government in regional 
manifestos increase under two circumstances: when the national co-partisans are 
in opposition during a period of economic crisis and low popularity of the national 
government, and when the national co-partisans are in office under a growing 
economy and enjoying high levels of popularity. 
This goes in the direction established by our hypothesis. Regional branches of 
national opposition parties increase the saliency of the national level in their 
regional manifestos when the national economy is performing badly and the 
national government is unpopular in an attempt to damage the electoral prospects 
of the national incumbent’s co-partisans in the regions, thereby nationalizing the 
regional campaigns. Regional branches of the national incumbent nationalize 
regional campaigns more often when the economy is going well and the national 
government is popular. In such a case, the emphasis on national-level issues in 
regional elections could help the regional branches to take credit for the good 
results of the party label. 
The previous descriptive analysis seems to offer some confirmatory evidence for 
our hypothesis; regional branches of national political parties nationalize regional 
elections under certain circumstances related to the economic and political 
context. The next logical step is to repeat the analysis using a regression model in 
order to explore more in depth the explanatory power of our predictors. 
The dependent variable is our indicator of nationalization, the percentage of quasi-
sentences addressing the national level of government in regional manifestos. As 
independent variables we include national incumbency, a dummy variable that 
adopts the value 1 when the party is in office at the national level and 0 otherwise, 
and, for the first model, a dummy variable named crisis and unpopularity, which 
indicates if the election was held in a period of national economic recession and a 
negative net evaluation of the national government (value 1) or a period of 
national economic growth and a positive net evaluation of the national 
government performance (value 0). We interact these two terms to test our 
hypothesis that predicts a negative coefficient: the party would avoid 
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nationalization when it is in office at the national level presiding under an 
economic crisis and with low levels of popularity. 
As control variables we include three dummies: party label, type of region, and 
vertical simultaneity. The first one, party label, adopts the value 1 when the party 
is the PP. We expect a positive coefficient. The regional branches of the PP would 
nationalize regional elections to a greater extent than those of the PSOE due to the 
different stances of these two parties regarding the territorial debate: the PP has 
traditionally defended the unity of Spain, while the PSOE has always been less 
reluctant to accommodate regionalist demands. The second one takes the value 1 
for the historical nationalities (Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia). These 
regions are characterized by the strong sense of historical and cultural identity of 
their inhabitants, by the presence of strong regionalist parties and by having their 
own electoral calendar. For these reasons, we can expect fewer references to the 
national level of government in the regional manifestos of these territories. The 
third variable is called vertical simultaneity and adopts the value 1 when regional 
and national elections are held on the same date. We expect a positive coefficient. 
As an additional robustness check the analysis is replicated with two alternative 
and independent measurements of the economic situation and the national 
government popularity instead of the simple dichotomy ‘crisis and unpopularity’ 
versus ‘growth and popularity’. In Model 2, we replace the dummy independent 
variable by a continuous measure of economic performance that takes into 
account the disparities across the Spanish regions: the GDP growth rate by region, 
which ranges from –4.2 to 6.9 throughout the period analyzed. An overwhelming 
majority of the Spanish population attributes the responsibility for regional 
economic conditions to the national government. More than 75 percent says that 
the central government is the administrative level responsible for things going 
well or badly in the economy, against just 11 percent that points at the regional 
governments (CIS 2012, Barómetro Autonómico III). Therefore, a good regional 
economic performance will be celebrated as part of the national government’s 
good management and will encourage the nationalization strategy among the 
national incumbent co-partisans. 
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In Model 3, we use public opinion data about the national government’s 
evaluation by region. The barometers of the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (CIS) include the following question on a quarterly basis: ‘As a 
whole, how would you rate the performance of the PSOE/the PP (national) 
government: very good, good, so-so, bad, or very bad?’’ We have reversed the 
scale and computed the mean for each region in the closest month to the regional 
election. The variable ranging from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good) has been mean-
centered because, unlike the regional GDP growth rate, it does not contain a 
meaningful value of 0. 
Table 4 
OLS Regression models, robust standard error clustered by region 
 Model 0 
Control 
variables 
only 
Model 1 
Crisis and 
unpop. 
(dummy) 
Model 2 
GDP growth 
by region 
Model 3 
National 
government 
popularity 
by region 
PP 0.683* 
(0.280) 
0.779* 
(0.299) 
0.553+ 
(0.269) 
0.545+ 
(0.282) 
Historical nationality -0.219 
(0.404) 
-0.219  
(0.409)    
-0.279 
(0.448) 
-0.219 
(0.409) 
Vertical simultaneity 
 
1.488*** 
(0.150) 
1.495*** 
(0.214) 
1.546*** 
(0.130) 
1.485*** 
(0.289) 
National incumbency - 0.863* 
(0.402)    
-0.774 
(0.467) 
-0.179 
(0.342) 
Crisis and unpopularity - 1.090*  
(0.436)    
- - 
National incumbency × 
Crisis and unpopularity 
- -2.151*** 
(0.528) 
- - 
GDP growth - - -0.192* 
(0.085) 
- 
National incumbency × 
GDP growth 
- - 0.292** 
(0.082) 
- 
National government 
popularity 
- - - -1.134** 
(0.389) 
National incumbency × 
National government 
popularity 
- - - 2.273*** 
(0.452) 
Constant 1.386*** 
(0.192) 
0.898*** 
(0.195) 
1.942*** 
(0.375) 
1.544*** 
(0.241) 
N 134 134 134 134 
adj. R-sq 0.0575 0.1466 0.1172 0.1583 
 
*** p<0,001; **p<0,01; * p<0,05; + p<0,10 (Standard errors in parenthesis). DV: Nationalization 
of regional elections (% of quasi-sentences addressing the national level in regional manifestos). 
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These alternative measurements of the state of the economy and citizens’ 
evaluation of national government’s performance are highly correlated between 
them (Pearson r is 0.62 and the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, two-
tailed test). Both in Model 2 and Model 3, we expect a positive coefficient of the 
interaction of these variables with national incumbency: an increase in either 
economic growth (Model 2) or national government popularity (Model 3) would 
be associated with an increase in nationalization when the national co-partisans 
are in office. 
In spite of the nested structure of the data, we use OLS-regression analysis due to 
the small number of cases in the dataset. In each region, we only have four waves 
of elections and two parties per wave. Nevertheless, all the models are computed 
with robust standard errors clustered by region. Results are shown in table 4. 
To help interpret correctly the coefficients of the interaction terms we have 
calculated the marginal effects of the independent variables of each model (crisis 
and unpopularity, GDP growth, and government popularity, respectively) 
conditional on national incumbency, following Brambor, Clark, and Golder’s 
(2006) suggestions. Results are reported in table 5. The effect of the variables 
measuring the economic or political performance on our indicator of 
nationalization is modified by incumbency at the national level. 
Table 5 
Estimated marginal effects conditional on national incumbency 
 Crisis and 
unpopularity 
(Model 1) 
GDP growth 
(Model 2) 
National 
government 
popularity 
(Model 3) 
National incumbency = No (0) 1.090* 
(0.436) 
-0.192* 
(0.085) 
-1.134** 
(0.389) 
National incumbency = Yes (1) -1.061* 
(0.416) 
0.099+ 
(0.058) 
1.140** 
(0.434) 
 
*** p<0,001; **p<0,01; * p<0,05; + p<0,10 (Standard errors in parenthesis). 
 
Chapter 3     71 
 
 
 
The influence of the interplay between national incumbency and the economic and 
political situation remains significant even if we use alternative measurements of 
the latter two. In Model 1, the sign of the interaction is negative, as we expected. 
To hold national office during a period of economic crisis and low popularity 
discourages parties from using the strategy of nationalization. Under this scenario, 
the regional branches choose to frame the regional campaign in regional terms. 
Additionally, the coefficient for crisis and unpopularity is significant. This is 
equivalent to the marginal effect of crisis and unpopularity for the national 
opposition and the sign is positive; i.e., the references to the national level of 
government increase. The regional branches of the national opposition frame the 
regional elections in national terms in order to undermine the incumbent’s 
electoral prospects in the regions. In doing so, they encourage voters to think 
about (the negative) incumbent’s performance at the national, not the regional, 
level when casting their votes in regional elections. 
The results of Models 2 and 3 also corroborate our hypothesis. The coefficient of 
the interaction between national incumbency and GDP growth is statistically 
significant and positive (model 2). A growing regional economy is associated with 
higher levels of nationalization when the co-partisans are in office at the national 
level. As depicted in table 5, if the party is the national opposition, the increase of 
the GDP has the opposite effect: the regional branches decrease the references to 
the national government in their manifestos, devoting more space to regional-level 
issues. 
The same effect is found when the independent variable introduced in the 
interaction is government popularity instead (Model 3). When the co-partisans are 
in office, an increase in the national government’s popularity in the region is 
linked with an increase in nationalization. However, when the co-partisans are in 
the opposition, the references to the national level of government decrease as the 
latter becomes more popular. This is clearly illustrated by Figure 2, which shows 
the predicted values of our dependent variable by national incumbency and 
national government popularity, according to model 3. A very similar picture 
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emerges when we plot the values predicted by model 2 replacing national 
government popularity by regional GDP growth (not shown here). 
Figure 2 
Predicted values of nationalization by national government popularity and incumbency 
(based on Model 3), with 95 percent C.I. in grey 
 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of the dummy variable which 
indicates historical nationalities (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country=1) is 
not significant in any of the three models. In fact, it is not even significant in 
model 0, where there are only the control variables. Nevertheless, the sign of the 
coefficient goes in all the cases in the expected direction, being negative. In 
contrast, the coefficient of the variable indicating vertical simultaneity is 
significant in all the models. As expected, if regional elections are held on the 
same date as national elections, the use of the strategy of nationalization by parties 
increases. The results are not as clear for the variable PP (People’s Party=1). Due 
to its major support for centralization, we expected the People’s Party engaging in 
the strategy of nationalization of regional elections more often than the PSOE. 
Model 1, and also Model 0 with just the control variables, suggests that this is the 
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case. The references to the national level of government increase in the regional 
manifestos of the PP. Nevertheless, in Models 2 and 3, the coefficient of the 
variable PP, that keeps the positive sign, is only significant at the 0.10 level. In 
these last models, the explanatory power of the variable PP is partially 
compensated by the effect of our crucial variables that come to the fore. Party 
labels seem to be more adaptable to the context than initially expected. The 
reputational constraint has a weaker influence over campaign decisions than the 
electoral benefits expected from the strategy of nationalization. 
Finally, although the model fit in all three regressions is not very good, R-square 
doubles when introducing in each model the key terms for our hypothesis (i.e., the 
main effects of incumbency and government/economic performance, and their 
crucial interaction) with respect to the model that only includes the control 
variables. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Our objective here was to demonstrate that national parties in decentralized states 
can emphasize and deemphasize their references to the national level of 
government in regional election campaigns and that they do so as an electoral 
strategy, one among many, to either gain votes or minimize electoral losses. We 
believe we have provided empirical evidence that moves in the direction of our 
theoretical argument, although given the scarcity of cases that we have analyzed 
we must be cautious in our conclusions. 
We have used manifesto data to explain under what circumstances the regional 
branches of the main Spanish national parties are more likely to nationalize 
regional elections. In this sense, our findings show two mirror strategies at play. 
First, a national opposition party nationalizes regional elections during a period of 
economic crisis and low popularity of the national government as a way to 
damage the electoral prospects of its competitor by transforming regional 
elections into a plebiscite on the national incumbent’s performance. Second, a 
national incumbent party nationalizes regional elections when the economy is 
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going well and the national government is popular in order to help its regional 
branches to take credit for the good results of the national government. 
Ultimately, the strategy of nationalization is always present, as there is always an 
electoral benefit to be reaped from using it by either of the two main national 
competitors. When things are going well and the incumbent is popular, we will 
see the regional co-partisans of the incumbent party nationalizing the regional 
election; alternatively, when things are going badly and the incumbent is 
unpopular, it is the turn of the regional co-partisans of the national opposition 
party to nationalize the regional election. The question that remains is which of 
these two mirror strategies is more intense and, unfortunately, our results are not 
clear in this respect. We need more cases with which to compare the Spanish case 
before we can say more about this. 
Our results have some interesting policy implications beyond the Spanish case. 
We have found a very strong institutional effect of the simultaneity of the 
electoral calendar and a weak effect of higher levels of self-government present in 
regions with a differentiated cultural, historical, or linguistic identity. In countries 
with a synchronic electoral calendar across levels of government, national parties 
will use the strategy of nationalization to a higher degree than in countries with 
diachronic electoral calendars. This means that a way of reducing the ‘second-
orderness’ of regional elections is to de-synchronize the electoral calendar. Doing 
this will reduce the degree of subordination of regional politics to national events 
and circumstances. On the other hand, the level of self-government achieved 
seems to be no guarantee for the independence of the regional electoral arena; 
only if combined with an independent electoral calendar is the level of self-
government a significant factor in reducing the ‘second-orderness’ of regional 
elections. 
There is still much to be done. We have but started to understand how parties 
nationalize regional elections. Moreover, and more importantly, we need to 
understand what makes these strategies succeed or fail. Do parties’ strategies of 
nationalization of regional elections actually have an impact on voting behavior? 
At this point, all we can do is formulate the question.  
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Chapter 4 
‘First-Order Thinking’ in Second-Order Contests: 
A Comparison of Local, Regional and European 
Elections in Spain21 
 
 
Abstract 
The second-order election model assumes that voting behaviour in sub-national 
and supra-national elections is nationally driven rather than motivated by level-
specific concerns. Yet, there is surprisingly little evidence on whether individuals 
consider issues belonging to the specific arena being contested (‘first-order 
thinking’) and when they are more likely to do it. Using survey data from Spain 
between 1999 and 2015, this article aims to address this gap. Three types of the 
so-called second-order elections are compared. It is shown that the proportion of 
citizens reporting that they take into account level-specific issues is by far higher 
in local and regional elections than in elections to the European Parliament. The 
probability of considering level-specific issues in these elections depends on 
individuals’ resources and orientations. ‘First-order thinking’ is not equally 
common among people with different educational attainment, employment status, 
ideology or attitudes towards the European Union or the local and regional 
governments. 
 
                                                            
21 This article is under review at the journal Electoral Studies. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The transfer of responsibilities from the national government to both supra-
national and sub-national authorities has given rise to the proliferation of directly-
elected institutions at different tiers of government in many countries. As a result, 
citizens have the chance to elect not just their national representatives, but also 
local, regional or, in the case of EU citizens, European ones. 
For some, voters are able to correctly attribute political responsibilities between 
levels of government; they evaluate the performance of politicians in each level 
and reward or punish them accordingly, no matter what happens in the other 
electoral arenas. From this perspective, local, regional and/or European elections 
are rather independent from first-order national elections, they should be explored 
‘on their own terms’, and few top-down spillovers or contamination effects should 
be expected (Abedi and Siaroff, 1999; Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Schakel and 
Jeffery, 2013). 
For many, however, multi-level governance paves the way for the contamination 
between electoral arenas. A complex institutional setting where the competences 
for major public policies are split between different layers of government would 
increase the difficulty for citizens to get relevant information about policies and 
government performance in each level. In the face of such difficulties, citizens 
would simply take their cues from the national level to vote in sub-national and 
supra-national elections. According to this view, local, regional and European 
elections are second-order contests subordinated to – or contaminated by – the 
first-order national arena (Anderson, 2006; Gélineau and Remmer, 2006; Marsh, 
1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Rodden and Wibbels, 2011). 
What is more likely is that the truth lies somewhere in-between these two 
extremes. ‘Second-orderness’ of sub-national and supra-national arenas is a matter 
of degree (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013; Van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 1996). 
It varies between elections, over time, from place to place, and, as claimed here, 
also among individuals. This article develops and tests a micro-level approach to 
the study of second-order effects in sub-national and supra-national elections 
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analysing ‘issue contamination’. It is argued that in every election there are 
individuals that decide their vote – or whether to vote or not – on the basis of 
level-specific considerations (‘first-order thinking’) and individuals that make 
their decisions based on what is going on in a different arena. Using data from a 
set of election surveys in Spain conducted between 1999 and 2015, this article 
first compares the proportion of citizens that consider level-specific issues in 
local, regional and European elections, and then analyses which individual 
characteristics are associated with ‘first-order thinking’ in each of these elections. 
Individuals’ resources and political orientations are examined and are found to be 
relevant. 
While several empirical studies have analyzed the second-order character of local, 
regional and European elections separately, there are no studies comparing the 
three of them. Only comparisons between local and European elections have been 
made so far in this regard (Heath et al., 1999; Rallings and Thrasher, 2005; 
Skrinis and Teperoglou, 2008). In addition, and more importantly, most of the 
previous research on the role of national factors in sub-national and supra-national 
elections is based on aggregate-level data (namely, election results), which makes 
impossible to test the individual-level assumptions on which the second-order 
election model is based. This article provides a simultaneous comparison of three 
sorts of the so-called second-order elections, and relies on individual survey data. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief 
overview of previous research investigating the second-order character of 
European, regional and local elections. Section 3 develops the theoretical 
argument for this study, and then section 4 formulates two basic propositions 
about micro-level determinants affecting the probability of considering level-
specific issues in second-order elections. Data source and method are introduced 
in section 5. After the presentation of the descriptive findings and regression 
results in section 6, the final section concludes. 
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4.2 The second-order election model, here and there 
4.2.1 European elections, or the origins of the second-order election 
model 
The concept of second-order elections was originally coined by Reif and Schmitt 
(1980) to refer to those elections in which there is ‘less at stake’ compared with 
the decisive presidential or parliamentary national elections. These scholars 
observed some regularities after analysing the first European elections (lower 
levels of voter turnout, electoral losses of the national government party, and 
electoral gains of smaller parties), concluding that the results of these elections 
held in 1979 in nine countries were not determined by factors belonging to the 
European political arena but by domestic political cleavages. Since then, 
numerous analyses of the successive European elections have shown similar 
results: in general, voters use elections to the European Parliament to reward or 
punish national governments in their respective countries rather than to express 
their preferences on European issues (Freire and Santana-Pereira, 2015; Hix and 
Marsh, 2007; 2011; Marsh, 1998; Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 2005; Van der Eijk, 
Franklin and Marsh, 1996). 
However, the second-order nature of European elections has also been called into 
question. The second-order election model does not work in an enlarged Europe 
(Central and Eastern former communist countries) so well as it does in western 
European member states (Koepke and Ringe, 2006). Furthermore, there are at 
least two factors that can lead to an increase in ‘first-order thinking’ in European 
elections. First, the European Parliament has gained more legislative powers and 
responsibilities over the years, especially after the novelties brought by the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009. Second, European integration has become a prominent political 
issue. The 2008 economic crisis in the eurozone, and the austerity measures taken 
in response to it, have resulted in a growing public contestation over the European 
project (Armingeon, Guthmann and Weisstanner, 2016), often reflected in the 
electoral success of Eurosceptic political parties in many member states. 
Researchers have begun to raise the question whether European elections were 
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less second-order in 2014 than before (Brug, Gattermann and Vreese, 2016; 
Nielsen and Franklin, 2017; Schmitt and Toygür, 2016). 
4.2.2 Regional elections as second-order elections, contradictory 
findings 
The second-order election model developed by Reif and Schmitt to explain the 
results of the European elections has been profusely applied to the analysis of 
regional elections. Previous research in both Europe and America has often led to 
divergent findings. On the one hand, empirical studies have shown that regional 
election results are influenced by national rather than regional economic or 
political conditions (Anderson, 2006; Gélineau and Remmer, 2006; Rodden and 
Wibbels, 2011). On the other hand, a growing body of evidence indicates that 
many regional elections do not conform to the expectations of the second-order 
elections approach (see, for example, Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). 
Institutional and contextual factors that raise the stakes of regional elections are 
considered to weaken second-order election effects, decreasing the degree of 
subordination of regional politics to national dynamics (Dandoy and Schakel, 
2013; Jeffery and Hough, 2003; León, 2014; Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). Thus, 
higher levels of decentralization, the saliency of territorial cleavages, the presence 
of regionalist parties or non-simultaneity with other electoral contests would 
contribute to reduce the influence of national politics on regional elections. 
4.2.3 Local elections, between first and second-order 
In comparison to national, regional or European elections, there is not as much 
research out there about local elections, even when there are multiple reasons to 
care about local politics (Miller, 1988). The local council is the level of 
administration that is closest to the people and for this reason can meet more 
easily local needs, theoretically enhancing participation and accountability (Blair, 
2000). The powers of local governments vary greatly between countries, but 
commonly they are responsible for providing a wide range of local services and 
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facilities in areas such as culture, social services, local roads, public transport or 
the environment. 
In most countries local election are considered to be just a ‘national referendum’ 
on the popularity of the government (Curtice and Payne, 1991) or a ‘barometer’ to 
predict the results of the subsequent national elections (Jérôme and Lewis-Beck, 
1999). Nevertheless, as with the regional elections, the empirical evidence is 
mixed. Studies on UK, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands suggest that local 
elections are not as second-order in nature as previously assumed. According to 
these studies, local elections are in a middle position between first and second-
order elections (Delgado, 2010; Heath et al., 1999; Lefevere and Van Aelst, 2014; 
Marien, Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2015; Rallings and Thrasher, 2005). They are 
still considered second-order elections but to a lesser extent than European 
elections because level-specific considerations seem to play a major role in 
determining vote choices in local elections. Heath and his co-authors (1999) put it 
like this: ‘If the elections to the European Parliament are regarded as second-
order, then we might think of elections to local councils as “one and three-quarters 
order”.’ (p.391). 
4.3 Turning to the micro-level 
The literature on second-order elections makes important assumptions about 
voter’s behaviour in order to explain the regularities that are found in aggregated 
election results. However, these assumptions tend to remain in a black box. 
Scholars have already started to recognize the need to check out the degree to 
which these assumptions are accurate and valid (Carrubba and Timpone, 2005; 
Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; Schmitt, Sanz and 
Braun, 2008). For instance, Clark and Rohrschneider (2009) write the following: 
‘The gap in our knowledge mainly results from the focus of most second-order 
elections models on aggregate election outcomes. This is somewhat surprising 
given that the logic of the argument attributes special importance to the 
perceptions of individuals in deciding how to cast their ballot’ (p.648). Hobolt and 
Wittrock (2011) share the same concern about the second-order literature warning 
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about ‘the lack of an explicit individual-level model of vote choice to explain the 
aggregated-level regularities’ (p.30). And Schmitt, Sanz and Braun (2008) 
complain about the scarcity of individual-level analysis recognizing that ‘the 
mechanisms that determine vote patterns in second-order elections cannot reliably 
be judged from the analysis of aggregate data’ (p.4). Despite the progress that has 
been made in the analysis of the micro-foundations of the second-order election 
model, there has been little research explicitly aimed at analyzing the fundamental 
question of when individuals are more or less likely to consider issues belonging 
to the specific arena being contested. 
4.3.1. Defining ‘issue contamination’ and ‘first-order thinking’ 
The assumptions of the second-order election model can be best approached by 
formulating and testing hypothesis about individual’s behaviour. What we have 
learnt so far about voting behaviour from studies at the national level is that 
political issues matter (Key, 1966; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1980). Individual 
electoral decisions are based on preferences for issues, as well as for parties and 
candidates. The first and probably the most basic premise of the second-order 
election model is that, instead of holding responsible sub-national and supra-
national representatives for their actions on the according level, citizens decide 
whether to vote and for whom on the grounds of issues and events belonging to a 
most relevant level. So far most of the previous research assumes that this level is 
systematically the national one. Nevertheless, this might not always be the case. 
Contamination effects have been defined as ‘a situation where either voters or 
party elites determine their political behaviour on the basis of other arenas, rather 
than the specific arena being contested’ (Guinjoan, 2014: 19). Thus defined, this 
can occur from one to any other level, and it can operate in any direction. For 
instance, it is reasonable to expect that what is going on at the regional level, and 
not only at the national one, might affect voting behaviour in local elections. The 
relevant question is not so much where is the source (or sources) of ‘issue 
contamination’, but which factors contribute to mitigate this phenomenon. 
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This article argues that, at the micro-level, in a given election there are individuals 
that decide their vote – or whether to vote or not – on the basis of level-specific 
issues (what here is called ‘first-order thinking’) and individuals that make their 
vote choices based on exogenous considerations. For example, voter A may cast a 
ballot in a specific regional election after evaluating the performance of the 
regional incumbent in regional-level issues, while voter B may vote in the same 
regional election keeping his eyes on the national government and its 
responsibilities. Voters that ‘think nationally’ in sub-national and supra-national 
elections, like voter B does, are in fact treating these contests as second-order 
elections, secondary in relevance with respect to the first order national political 
arena. By contrast, individuals making their choices as a result of level-specific 
factors, like voter A does, are treating sub-national and supra-national elections as 
first-order arenas, considering what is really at stake. The individual propensity to 
look at level-specific issues might depend on individual-level factors. This is 
precisely what this article aims to examine. 
At the macro-level, each election will show a different distribution of voters 
depending on the amount of citizens thinking in level-specific issues, that is: local 
issues in local elections, regional issues in regional elections, and European issues 
in elections to the European Parliament. A high degree of polarization around a 
national issue can make that more citizens take into account national factors to 
vote in sub-national or supra-national election. For example, in a local election A 
with 100 individuals the distribution of voters influenced by local versus national 
factors can be 90-10. If the following local election B in the same municipality is 
held just after the revelation of a big corruption scandal affecting the national 
incumbent, the distribution would probably change in favour of those voters who 
are nationally driven. Thus, in this example, election B will show in aggregated 
terms a higher degree of ‘second-orderness’ than election A because the 
proportion of citizens with ‘first-order thinking’ is lower. 
Both mass media and political parties might play an important role. The media has 
the capacity to place certain political issues at the heart of the public debate as 
research on agenda-setting has proved long ago (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). 
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Political parties, in turn, develop electoral strategies by giving salience to national 
or level-specific topics during the second-order election campaign (Cabeza, 
Gómez and Alonso, 2017). This article does not attempt to analyse the role of 
mass media or political parties in fostering or discouraging the salience of level-
specific issues. Rather, it focuses on some micro-level factors that might 
potentially induce ‘first-order thinking’ in second-order elections. As will be 
argued below, these factors are related with individuals’ resources and 
motivations. 
4.4 The individual determinants of ‘first-order thinking’ 
This section formulates two basic propositions about micro-level determinants 
affecting the likelihood of considering level-specific issues in second-order 
elections. Some specific hypotheses are then derived from each proposition. One 
could reasonably expect that the likelihood of developing ‘first-order thinking’ in 
local, regional and European contests is a joint function of the individual’s ability 
to distinguish between levels (resource-based approach) and his or her political 
orientations (motivation-based approach). This classic distinction is borrowed 
from the literature on political participation (Verba and Nie, 1987). 
4.4.1 Resource-based approach  
Making vote choices in multi-level states is not an easy task. To find clear-cut 
divisions between the competencies of each level of administration is rather 
unusual. Governmental responsibilities are often intertwined among different 
levels of government. The ability of citizens to distinguish between levels and to 
correctly attribute political responsibilities might depend on individuals’ political 
sophistication, resources and capabilities. The first proposition is formulated as 
follows: 
(H1) Individuals with higher political sophistication, resources and capacity to 
process complex political information are more likely to consider level-specific 
issues in local, regional and European elections. 
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Regarding political sophistication, ‘first-order thinking’ is expected to increase 
with the exposure to political information related with the specific arena, that is, 
with the level of interest that individuals have in following the election campaign 
(H1.1). But individuals’ resources and capabilities also depend on more general 
personal attributes, such as socio-economic characteristics. It is well known that 
socially disadvantaged citizens, those jobless or with less education or income 
tend to vote at a lower rates than those with a higher socioeconomic status 
(Lijphart, 1997; Verba and Nie, 1987). Do the level of education and the 
employment situation affect in a similar way the presence of ‘first-order thinking’ 
among citizens in second-order elections? The likelihood of considering level-
specific issues in local, regional and European elections is expected to increase 
with the level of education (H1.2) and to be higher for employed individuals than 
for those unemployed, retired or out of the workforce (H1.3). 
4.4.2 Motivation-based approach  
Individuals must not only be capable of distinguishing among levels, but also be 
inclined to do it. The second proposition of this article is formulated as follows: 
(H2) Changes in the likelihood of taking into account level-specific issues 
respond to different political orientations, beliefs and preferences 
The main premise behind this proposition is that individuals should perceive that 
the second-order arena is important in order to develop ‘first-order thinking’. Two 
factors are considered to be relevant: policy preferences on the ideological and 
territorial dimensions, and attitudes towards Europe and the local and regional 
governments. 
Policy preferences on the ideological (left-right) and territorial dimensions 
(centre-periphery) are expected to play an important role. These are the two core 
dimensions of party competition in multi-level states (Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber, 
2015), and they are closely associated with attitudes towards the different political 
arenas. 
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Starting with the centre-periphery dimension, there are a wide variety of very 
different preferences regarding the territorial organization of the state. Some 
individuals advocate for decentralization or even support the secession of a region 
from the nation-state, while others are favourable to centralization or prefer a 
unitary state. The former are expected to be more inclined to take into account 
level-specific issues in second-order elections than the latter (H2.1). Support for a 
regionalist party is used as proxy for positions in favour of decentralization. 
The relationship between regional identity and ‘first-order thinking’ is rather 
straightforward in regional elections. As recent evidence has demonstrated, 
regional issues play a major role vis-à-vis national considerations in voting 
decisions among voters with strong regional identity feelings (Liñeira, 2016). 
Regionalist voters would probably be more involved with regional politics and 
more motivated to gather political information about issues and events taking 
place at the regional level. However, regionalist supporters are also expected to 
develop ‘first-order thinking’ in other levels such as the European or the local. 
Although there are exceptions inside this party family in several countries, 
regionalist parties tend to support European integration (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 
2002). Europe is perceived more as an ally against the central state than as an 
enemy to the aspirations of autonomy among the regions (Jolly, 2007). Previous 
research has found that regionalist identity is associated with pro-EU attitudes 
among voters (Chacha, 2013; Jolly, 2014). In local elections, regional identities 
might also promote ‘first-order thinking’, as regionalist supporters might be more 
inclined to care about local rather than national issues. 
Regarding the position of the voters on the left-right dimension, different 
expectations are held for sub- and supra-national elections. Extreme right and 
extreme left ideologies are classically associated with negative attitudes towards 
the EU, while voters in more moderate and centrist positions are more likely to 
support European integration (Hix, 2007). For this reason, the self-placement of 
individuals on the left-right scale is expected to have an inverted-U shape 
relationship with ‘first-order thinking’ in elections to the European Parliament. 
That is, extreme ideologies in both the right and the left impair, whereas moderate 
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positions facilitate that citizens take into account European issues in European 
elections (H2.2.1). 
This expectation changes for local and regional levels. Previous research has 
found that while parties on the economic right support decentralization more often 
than economic left-wing parties, conservatism on the cultural dimension is 
associated with positions against decentralization (Toubeau and Wagner, 2015). 
Conservative ideologies are often linked to the preservation of the national unity 
and the territorial integrity of the country. Culturally liberal parties and their 
supporters, by contrast, tend to adopt more favourable positions towards the 
decentralization of decision-making to sub-national units. The relationship 
between left-right ideology and decentralization is susceptible to differ from 
country to country. In Spain, effectively, the conservative right-wing People’s 
Party represents Spanish nationalism, while the left-wing PSOE advocates for a 
more federal and decentralized state (Gómez and Cabeza, 2013). The enduring 
monopolisation of patriotism by the right has led to many Spanish left-wing 
citizens to support decentralization and to reject Spanish national identity and 
symbols (Ruiz Jiménez, González-Fernández and Jiménez Sánchez, 2015). For 
the Spanish case, due to their stronger attachment to the national level, right-wing 
individuals are expected to be less likely to develop ‘first-order thinking’ in local 
and regional elections than individuals with left-wing political orientations 
(H2.2.2). 
Finally, attitudes towards Europe and the local and regional governments are 
expected to affect ‘first-order thinking’ in second-order elections. In sub-national 
elections, government performance might influence the extent to which citizens 
take into account level-specific issues. Attention towards what is going on in the 
specific level is susceptible to increase under two situations: when the level-
specific government is very popular and when it is not popular at all. In other 
words, the likelihood of considering level-specific issues increases with extreme 
government evaluations (H2.3.1). At the European level, pro-EU attitudes are 
expected to be associated with ‘first-order thinking’ in elections to the European 
Parliament (H2.3.2).  
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Table 1 summarizes all the expectations. 
Table 1 
Summary of expectations 
(H1) Individuals with higher political sophistication, resources and capacity to 
process complex political information are more likely to consider level-specific issues 
in local, regional and European elections 
Variable The likelihood to consider level-specific issues... 
Exposure to political 
information ...increases with the interest in the election campaign. 
Education 
 
...increases with the level of education. 
Employment status 
 
...is higher for employed. 
(H2) Changes in the likelihood to take into account level-specific issues in local, 
regional and European elections respond to different political orientations, beliefs 
and preferences 
Variable The likelihood to consider level-specific issues... 
Position on the territorial 
dimension ...is higher for regionalist supporters. 
Position on the left-right 
dimension 
...is lower for individuals in the far-right and the far-left 
   (in European elections). 
  
...is lower for right-wing individuals 
   (in local & regional elections). 
Attitudes towards second-
order arena 
...increases with positive attitudes towards the EU 
   (in European elections). 
...increase with extreme government evaluations 
   (in local & regional elections). 
 
4.5 Data, case and methods 
Voter turnout or party gains and losses in sub-national or supra-national elections 
compared to the preceding national election are frequently used as dependent 
variables in order to measure the level of ‘second-orderness’ of non national 
elections. In many cases, the empirical focus is on dissimilarity indexes between 
election results (Schakel, 2011). The logic behind this approach is that sub-
national and supra-national elections are more influenced by national factors the 
less their results deviate from national election results. But similarities in vote 
shares do not imply that national-level factors play a role on vote choices in sub-
national and supra-national elections. Citizens may choose the same political 
party across elections because they prefer similar policies to be implemented at 
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different levels of government. Or they can still make the same vote choice based 
on different level-specific considerations. The use of aggregate data does not seem 
appropriate if one intends to disentangle whether individuals’ choices are based 
on level-specific issues or not. 
4.5.1 The Spanish case 
This article employs individual-level data from the Spanish case. Spain constitutes 
an ideal case to investigate when and why level-specific considerations play a role 
in vote decisions at sub-national and supra-national levels. Within a short period 
of time, Spain has evolved from an hypercentralist state to a highly decentralized 
country with 17 powerful regions, constitutional recognition of the principle of 
local self-government and an active role in the process of Europeanization 
(Moreno, 2001). Internal heterogeneity provides a quasi-experimental setting. In 
the same country (that is, controlling for common institutional characteristics) 
there are great territorial disparities. 
From a practical point of view, the Spanish case offers an additional advantage 
due to the availability of survey data: the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 
(CIS), a public research institute, conduct highly informative surveys for elections 
at local, regional and European levels. 
4.5.2 Measuring ‘first-order thinking’ 
Post-election surveys carried out for local, regional and European elections in 
Spain by the CIS often include a direct question on the subjective relevance 
attributed to national versus level-specific issues in vote decisions. The use of 
such a direct question to assess citizens’ motivations has been criticised because 
responses may be subject to social desirability bias (Liñeira, 2016). It would be 
wrong to assume that the potential bias due to social desirability does not exist at 
all. Undoubtedly, respondents may find reasonable to answer that they take into 
account local issues in local elections, regional issues in regional elections, and 
European issues in European elections. However, Figure 1 suggests that this is not 
always the case. The proportion of respondents reporting that they think about 
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level-specific issues changes a lot between different types of elections, being in 
fact very low for European elections. Furthermore, over time patterns, and also 
differences from region to region (for instance between ordinary and historic 
regions) conform to literature predictions. Thus, it appears reasonable and feasible 
to use this direct question. After all, the bias should not be problematic if the 
arguments are based not as much in absolute values for each level but in relative 
values, i.e.: differences between levels. 
For European elections, the question is asked as follows: 
Personally, when deciding your vote (or whether to vote or not) in the last 
elections to the European Parliament, what did you take into account or what 
has most influenced your decision? 
The issues related with the European Union and the European Parliament 
The issues related with the current political situation in Spain 
 
Elections to the European Parliament are held in Spain since 1987, although the 
question was first included in the surveys in 1994, after the third European 
election.  
In a similar way, post-election surveys of regional elections frequently ask the 
following: 
Personally, when deciding your vote (or whether to vote or not) in the last 
parliamentary election in [region’s name], what did you take into account or 
what has most influenced your decision? 
The issues of [region’s name] 
The issues of Spain 
 
Spain is made up of 17 autonomous regions (Comunidades Autónomas). Elections 
are held simultaneously in 13 out of the 17 regions, the ordinary regions. The 
historic regions, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, and also Andalusia 
have their own electoral calendar and held elections on a specific date set by their 
respective regional parliaments. For the 13 ordinary regions that hold regional 
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elections at the same time, the relevant survey question is included in 1995, 1999, 
2007, 2011 and 2015. In the case of Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country and 
Andalusia, the question is asked only in one post-election survey: 2015 in the 
former, 2012 in the three latter. 
The question is practically identical in post-elections surveys for local elections. 
In that case, however, an additional response option is given to the respondents 
making reference to the regional level: 
Personally, when deciding your vote (or whether to vote or not) in the last City 
Council elections in [city’s name], what did you take into account or what has 
most influenced your decision? 
The issues of [city’s name] 
The issues of [region’s name] 
The issues of Spain 
 
In Spain there are more than 8.000 municipalities. Local elections in all the 
country are held on the same date as the regional elections in the 13 ordinary 
regions. The CIS conduct post-election surveys in four cities which vary 
considerably in population size: Barcelona (1,6 million inhabitants), Sevilla (close 
to 694.000 inhabitants), Vitoria (close to 244.000 inhabitants) and Santiago de 
Compostela (95.800 inhabitants). The question is included in the following 
surveys: 1995, 2007, 2011 and 2015. 
Sometimes there are little changes in the wording of the question. In some cases, 
the question is included in pre-election instead of post-election surveys leading to 
small variations. These differences are nevertheless slight and, as long as the 
general meaning is the same, may not affect comparability of data. 
4.5.3 Multivariate analysis 
This article uses logistic regression analysis to model the individual’s probability 
of considering level-specific issues. Local, regional and European elections are 
analysed in three models. 
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Full micro data files are publicly available only from 1998 onwards. That means 
that the multivariate analysis will not include data from the surveys conducted in 
1994 (European elections) and 1995 (regional and local elections). However, it is 
possible to obtain summary measures such as the frequency distributions for the 
relevant question and this information is used in Figure 1. Surveys for the regional 
elections held in 1999 should also be discarded for the multivariate analysis 
because not all the independent variables were present in the questionnaires. 
The available survey data containing the relevant question have been merged in 
order to create three different pooled datasets: local, regional and European 
elections, respectively. After dropping the cases with missing values, the total 
number of individuals in the three datasets is N=6,925 for local elections (three 
elections from 2007 to 2015 in four municipalities), N=47,765 for regional 
elections (three elections from 2007 to 2015 in thirteen ordinary regions; 2012 in 
Andalusia, Galicia and Basque Country; and 2015 in Catalonia) and N=13,831 for 
the European elections (four state-wide elections from 1999 to 2014) (see 
Appendix). 
The dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is ‘first-order thinking’ 
constructed from the responses to the questions introduced above. It is measured 
by a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that the individual reports to take 
mainly into account level-specific issues (i.e. local issues in local elections, 
regional issues in regional elections and European issues in European elections), 
and 0 otherwise. 
In order to test the first proposition (resource-based approach) the following 
independent variables are included in the models: interest in the election 
campaign, education, and employment status. The level of interest in the election 
campaign is measured in a scale from less to more interest. Education and 
employment status are measured as categorical variables. 
Regarding the second proposition (motivation-based approach) three independent 
variables are included in each model. First, support for a regionalist party is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, with value 1 if the respondent has voted for 
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a regionalist party either in level-specific or in national elections, and 0 otherwise. 
Second, ideology is included as a categorical variable with five values: left, 
centre-left, centre, centre-right and right. Finally, for European elections, a 
variable about general attitudes towards the EU is included in the model, 
measured in a 7-point scale from ‘totally against’ to ‘totally in favour’. For local 
and regional elections, this variable is replaced by the retrospective evaluation of 
local or regional governments respectively, measured as a categorical variable: 
very bad, bad, average, good, very good. 
The focus of this article is on individual-level determinants of ‘first-order 
thinking’. Nevertheless, the conditions under which individuals are expected to 
distinguish between levels of government are also potentially affected by 
contextual factors. Both as shown bellow in Figure 1 and as suggested by previous 
research, the state of the economy matters (Schakel, 2015). Therefore, 
unemployment rate is included in the model. The likelihood to consider issues 
belonging to the specific arena being contested is expected to decrease when 
unemployment grows. 
The percentage of respondents considering level-specific issues in regional 
elections also increases in regions that have their own election calendar, that is, in 
Andalusia, Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia (Figure 1). Previous empirical 
analysis have shown that second-order election effects are larger when several 
regional elections are held on the same day (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). 
Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between the extent of second-order 
election effects in regional elections and the level of decentralization (León, 
2014). The influence of national politics on regional elections decreases when 
more powers are transferred to the regional government. Those regions in which 
the level of authority is higher are frequently the ones in which there is a salient 
territorial cleavage, a distinct history and/or language, and a party system 
characterized by the presence of non state-wide parties. All these factors 
contribute to focus the debate on regional issues. For these reasons, two dummy 
variables are included in the statistical model for regional elections: one for 
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Andalusia and another for the three historic regions: Catalonia, Basque Country 
and Galicia. 
Finally, among the contextual factors that can affect the degree of ‘second-
orderness’ of local elections, previous research has point out to the size of the 
municipality. Voters in small-sized towns pay more attention to local politics and, 
for instance, they are more likely to deviate from their national partisan 
preferences. By contrast, in big cities the saliency of local politics is lower and 
national issues are expected to have a greater effect on vote choices (Marien, 
Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2015; Schleicher, 2016). Therefore, size of the 
municipality is included in the model for local elections. 
In all the statistical models, cluster-robust standard errors by survey are calculated 
to account for the clustered structure of the data. 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 How many citizens report to vote on the basis of level-specific 
issues? 
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis, Figure 1 shows the 
proportion of respondents reporting that they vote on the basis of level-specific 
issues in local, regional and European elections. It may come as no surprise that 
‘first-order thinking’ is rather unusual in European elections. Only between 10 
and 20 per cent of the Spanish population decide whether to vote and for whom in 
elections to the European Parliament thinking in European issues. Far more 
striking is the fact that rather than increasing, the figure has decreased over time 
since 2004 reaching its lower level in the 2014 European elections, the most 
important European elections to date as stated on the European Parliament’s 
website. Under the official slogan ‘This time it’s different’, the 2014 European 
elections were expected to prompt greater interest among citizens specially 
because for the first time there was a closer link between election outcomes and 
the appointment of the president of the European Commission (Gyárfášová, 
2017). Despite this, and despite the increasing attention towards European politics 
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due to the economic crisis and the rise of Euroscepticism, the majority of the 
Spanish population made their choices in the 2014 European elections according 
to national considerations, just as before. 
 
Figure 1 
Percentage of respondents reporting to take level-specific issues into account 
 
 
Note: In local elections, average in Barcelona, Sevilla, Vitoria and Santiago de Compostela. In 
regional elections, average in the thirteen regions which hold regional elections in the same day. 
Regions with their own electoral calendar:  
1 Average in Andalusia, Galicia and Basque Country (2012) 
2 Catalonia (2015). 
 
While the elections to the European Parliament are mostly nationally driven, local 
and regional elections present a very different picture. A clear majority of 
respondents (between 60 and 75 per cent) report that they take mainly into 
account local issues to decide their vote in local elections. ‘First-order thinking’ in 
regional elections is also high. On average, around 50 or 60 per cent of the 
respondents in ordinary regions have regional issues in mind when they are called 
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to the ballot boxes in regional elections. The figure rises in regions which have 
their own electoral calendar. In Catalonia, for example, 7 out of 10 respondents 
reported to take into account regional issues in 2015, more than 20 points above 
than the average for the 13 regions with simultaneous elections. These differences 
between regions are consistent with previous empirical findings suggesting that 
the degree of subordination of regional politics to national dynamics decreases 
when regional elections are not held at the same time, or in regions with a salient 
centre-periphery cleavage (León, 2014; Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). 
The last thing that stands out from the data presented in Figure 1 is that local, 
regional and European elections share a very similar pattern of change over time. 
Since 2007 there is a decrease in ‘first-order thinking’ in the three elections 
simultaneously. This decrease seems to be related with the economic situation. 
Previous research has shown that the state of the economy is key to understand 
second-order election effects (Schakel, 2015). The decline of the national 
government popularity in times of economic downturn is expected to boost 
second-order election effects in non-national elections. Negative economic growth 
or increasing unemployment may lead voters to turn to national issues in local, 
regional and European elections because citizens tend to attribute the 
responsibility for the economic situation to the national government. In fact, when 
the economy deteriorates national government parties end up losing vote share not 
only in sub-national elections (Rogers 2013; Schleicher 2016) but also in elections 
to the European Parliament (Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009). In sum, as shown in 
Figure 1, when the economy turns down, people seem less inclined to consider 
issues belonging to the specific arena being contested.  
4.6.2 When are individuals more likely to take into account level-
specific issues? 
Coefficients reported in Table 2 show which groups of respondents are more 
likely to consider level-specific issues in each election. The results are mostly in 
line with the expectations formulated in section 3. 
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Table 2 
Results of logistic regressions 
 
Local elections Regional elections European elections 
 
Coef. 
Robust 
S.E. 
Coef. 
Robust 
S.E. 
Coef. 
Robust 
S.E. 
Resources 
  
    
Empl. Status 
  
    
   Employed (ref.cat.) 
   Unemployed -0.292*** (0.068) -0.091** (0.031) -0.088** (0.033) 
   Retired -0.018 (0.108) -0.080** (0.031) -0.030 (0.036) 
   Other -0.139 (0.094) -0.091* (0.041) -0.048 (0.065) 
Education 
  
    
   No formal educ. (ref.cat.) 
   Primary 0.014 (0.140) -0.091 (0.075) 0.208 (0.109) 
   Secondary 0.190* (0.094) -0.140 (0.072) 0.327*** (0.093) 
   Tertiary 0.329*** (0.102) -0.054 (0.089) 0.610*** (0.125) 
Interest in 
campaign 
0.041 (0.054) 0.022 (0.016) 0.205*** (0.029) 
Political motivation 
Regionalist 0.188 (0.189) 1.272*** (0.161) 0.160** (0.069) 
Ideology 
  
    
   Left (ref.cat.) 
   Center-Left 0.287* (0.137) 0.110 (0.072) 0.026 (0.096) 
   Center 0.271** (0.103) -0.119 (0.077) -0.022 (0.152) 
   Center-R. -0.022 (0.171) -0.141 (0.080) -0.073 (0.162) 
   Right -0.553* (0.231) -0.342*** (0.106) -0.048 (0.157) 
Gov. evaluation 
   Very bad (ref.cat.) 
   Bad -0.216** (0.072) 0.089 (0.055) - - 
   Average -0.267* (0.119) 0.199* (0.078) - - 
   Good -0.314* (0.142) 0.396*** (0.104) - - 
   Very good -0.203 (0.148) 0.399* (0.158) - - 
Attitudes EU - - - - 0.254*** (0.013) 
Contextual factors 
Unempl. rate -0.014 (0.011) -0.012* (0.005) -0.019** (0.008) 
Size Municip. -0.187* (0.094) - - - - 
Region type 
  
    
   Historic - - 0.115 (0.108) - - 
   Andalusia - - 0.541*** (0.084) - - 
Constant 1.991*** (0.594) 0.221 (0.163) -3.409*** (0.095) 
N 6,925  47,765  13,831  
Pseudo R² 0.0208  0.0347  0.0380  
∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p <0.01, ∗ p < 0.05. Standard errors clustered by survey. Dependent variable: 
‘First-order thinking’ (1=Yes; 0=No) 
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Starting with the variables measuring individuals’ resources, to be unemployed 
has a negative influence on ‘first-order thinking’ in the three types of contests 
analysed here. That is, individuals who are unemployed are less likely than those 
having a job to consider level-specific issues in local, regional and European 
elections. 
To facilitate interpretation of the statistical results, table 3 reports the expected 
probability of considering level-specific issues in each type of election for 
respondents with and without employment. After holding other factors constant, 
being unemployed decreases the probability of ‘first-order thinking’ by 6 points in 
local election, 2 points in regional elections and 1 point in European elections. 
 
Table 3 
Expected probability of ‘first-order thinking’ according to employment status 
 
Employed Unemployed 
Difference 
Column 2 - Column 1 
Local elections 70.7% 64.4% -6.2 
Regional elections 56.2% 54.0% -2.1 
European elections 18.0% 16.8% -1.2 
 
 
As to the level of education, the coefficients are significant and in the expected 
direction for local and European elections. Higher education increases ‘first-order 
thinking’ in both types of elections. However, this does not hold for regional 
elections, where there are no statistically significant differences with regard to 
education. Table 4 shows the expected probability of considering level-specific 
issues comparing respondents with lower and higher educational attainment. The 
effect of education entails an increase of 7 points in the probability of considering 
level-specific issues in local elections. In European elections the probability of 
‘first-order thinking’ among individuals with university degree is more than 8 
points higher than among individuals with no formal education. Significant 
coefficients with regard to education for European and, to a lesser degree, local 
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elections, may follow from the fact that political knowledge is particularly 
important in these instances. 
 
Table 4 
Expected probability of ‘first-order thinking’ according to level of education 
 
No formal 
Education 
Tertiary 
education 
Difference 
Column 2 - Column 1 
Local elections 65.7% 72.5% 6.9 
Regional elections a 57.5% 56.2% -1.3 
European elections 13.2% 21.6% 8.4 
 
a Differences are not statistically significant 
 
The last variable regarding resources is interest in the election campaign. While 
there is a positive relationship between the level of interest in the campaign and 
‘first-order thinking’ in European elections, the coefficients of this variable for 
local and regional elections fail to meet statistical significance. To follow the 
election campaign with interest does not translate into an increase in ‘first-order 
thinking’ in sub-national elections. This could possibly be explained by the fact 
that election campaigns are not always dominated by issues belonging to the 
specific arena being contested. Far from promoting the clarity of responsibilities, 
politicians frequently wilfully contribute to blur the responsibilities of each level. 
There has been evidence showing that political parties emphasize national issues 
during regional election campaigns to gain electoral advantage (Cabeza, Gómez 
and Alonso, 2017). 
Turning to political motivations, regionalist voters as compared with the rest of 
respondents are more likely to consider level-specific issues in regional and in 
European elections. While in European elections the effect is very moderate, 
being a regionalist voter increase in as many as 27 points the probability of ‘first-
order thinking’ in regional elections (Table 5). In local elections the difference 
does not reach statistical significance. In fact, many regionalist voters report to 
take into account regional issues in local elections. 
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Table 5 
Expected probability of ‘first-order thinking’ according to regionalist supporter 
 
Non regionalist 
supporter 
Regionalist 
supporter 
Difference 
Column 2 - Column 1 
Local elections a 68.6% 72.4% 3.8 
Regional elections 52.1% 79.3% 27.2 
European elections 17.4% 19.8% 2.3 
 
a Differences are not statistically significant 
 
The hypothesis on the U-shaped relationship between ideology and ‘first-order 
thinking’ in European elections is not supported, as coefficients are not 
statistically significant. To be left or right-wing oriented does not significantly 
affect the probability of considering level-specific issues in elections to the 
European Parliament. This result may be specific to the Spanish case. Unlike in 
other countries, anti-European parties are totally irrelevant in terms of electoral 
support in Spain. In spite of the erosion of the traditional positive image of the 
European Union reflected in the Spanish surveys, the economic crisis has not led 
so far to the emergence of strong euroscepticism in the Spanish party system, 
neither on the left nor on the right (Gómez-Reino and Plaza, 2016). However, 
consistent with the expectations described in section 3, ideology matters in sub-
national elections: individuals with right-wing political orientation are less likely 
to consider level-specific issues in local and regional elections than individuals 
who endorse left-wing ideologies (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
Expected probability of ‘first-order thinking’ according to ideology 
 
Left 
Center-
left Center 
Center-
right Right 
Difference 
Col.5 – Col.1 
Local elections 66.0% 72.0% 71.1% 65.5% 53.1% -12.9 
Regional elections 56.5% 59.0% 53.6% 53.1% 48.3% -8.2 
European elections a 17.9% 18.2% 17.5% 16.8% 17.2% -0.7 
 
a Differences are not statistically significant 
104     Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Finally, regarding the attitudes towards the European Union and the local and 
regional governments, coefficients in Table 2 are statistically significant in the 
three types of election. On the one hand, as expected, the chances of considering 
level-specific issues in elections to the European Parliament increase with 
favourable opinions about the European Union. The expected probability of ‘first-
order thinking’ is nearly 18 points higher among individuals totally in favour of 
the European Union with respect to those totally against. On the other hand, 
government performance does not have the same effect in local and regional 
elections. 
 
Figure 2 
Expected probability of ‘first-order thinking’ according to government evaluation 
 
Figure 2A. Local elections 
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Figure 2B. Regional elections 
 
 
In local elections, in line with the expectations described in section 3, extremely 
bad or good government evaluations are associated with an increase in the 
probability of considering level-specific issues (Figure 2A). This increase, 
however, is very small. The difference is slightly higher in regional elections. 
Positive retrospective evaluations of the regional government increase the 
likelihood of considering regional issues (Figure 2B). But unpopularity does not 
result in an increase in ‘first-order thinking’. 
4.6.3 Does ‘first-order thinking’ matter? 
There would be no need to worry about whether and when individuals consider 
level-specific issues if there were no consequences in terms of voting behaviour. 
For this reason, although it goes beyond the objectives of this article, it might be 
useful to conclude with some descriptive evidence on the relationship between 
‘first-order thinking’ and the behaviour of voters in local, regional and European 
elections. Table 7 shows that ‘first-order thinking’ is systematically lower among 
citizens that end up abstaining from voting, and systematically higher among 
people defecting from the party they voted for in the last national elections. This 
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applies to local, regional and European elections alike, providing reasonable 
grounds to believe that thinking or not in level-specific issues has electoral 
consequences. 
 
Table 7 
Percentage of respondents reporting to take level-specific issues into account 
according to voting behaviour (n in parenthesis) 
 
 
European 
elections 
Regional 
election 
Local 
elections 
Vote for a different party 
than in national elections 
21.6% 
(541) 
62.3% 
(2,253) 
78.6% 
(431) 
Vote while having 
abstained in national elec. 
19.6% 
(306) 
59.6% 
(1,533) 
74.4% 
(245) 
Vote for the same party 
than in national elections 
18.0% 
(8,104) 
55.5% 
(32,903) 
69.2% 
(4,462) 
Abstain 15.1% 
(2,469) 
45.5% 
(8,702) 
63.6% 
(1,705) 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
Previous literature, based mainly on aggregate data, has focused on analysing 
whether sub-national and supra-national elections are second-order contests 
subordinated to national politics. In many cases, the conclusion researchers came 
to was affirmative. Nevertheless, research findings depend largely on research 
questions. The present study has reversed the aforementioned question. Thus, it 
aimed to analyse how many citizens report to make their electoral choices on the 
basis of level-specific issues in local, regional and European elections, and when 
they are more likely to do it. 
The most immediate conclusion in this study is perhaps that sub-national elections 
are not comparable to European elections with regard to the extension of ‘issue 
contamination’. This result is in line with a stream of research that considers that 
the second-order election model does not travel well from the context in which it 
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was originated, the elections to the European Parliament, to local or regional 
elections (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). Whereas only a minority takes European 
issues into account when voting in European elections, the majority of people 
report that local and regional issues determine their behaviour in local and 
regional elections, respectively. Furthermore, in spite of the greater politicization 
of the European project after the 2008 economic crisis, no upward trend in ‘first-
order thinking’ is detected in European elections. 
Two micro-level determinants potentially inducing ‘first-order thinking’ in 
second-order elections were examined. This article proposed that the likelihood of 
considering issues belonging to the specific arena being contested depends on 
individual’s resources and his or her political orientations. With respect to 
individual’s resources, employment status and education are found to be relevant, 
especially in local and European elections. ‘First-order thinking’ increases with 
the level of education and is higher among those with a job in comparison to 
unemployed persons. As for political orientations, pro-EU attitudes are positively 
associated with ‘first-order thinking’ in European elections. In local and regional 
elections, citizens on the right side of the ideological scale are less likely to 
consider level-specific issues than those having left-wing political preferences. 
Interestingly, it is in regional elections where political orientations have vis-à-vis 
individuals’ resources a higher effect on ‘first-order thinking’. One of the more 
relevant factor in the case of regional elections is regionalist identity, as reported 
also by previous research (Liñeira, 2016). In fact, after including the variable 
regionalist supporter in the statistical model, to live in an historic region do not 
increase the likelihood of considering regional issues. If elections in regions with 
higher levels of authority are less second-order (as previous research suggested), it 
is probably due to the presence of more regionalist voters, for which regional 
issues take precedence over national issues in vote decisions. Regionalist voters 
are also more likely to consider level-specific issues in European elections. 
Conclusions drawn here should be, however, viewed cautiously. Findings are 
based on a direct question on the relevance attributed to national or level-specific 
issues in voting decisions. This has advantages over previous measurements, but 
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also disadvantages: the potential bias due to social desirability in the subjective 
responses is a possibility that cannot be absolutely excluded. Furthermore, the 
absence of a similar question in comparative survey studies made it necessary to 
rely upon survey data from a single country, Spain, which may limit the 
generalizability of the results to other cases. 
Notwithstanding the limitations, this article has several strengths. Whereas most 
studies on this topic focus on aggregate election outcomes, the present analysis 
heeds the call for more individual-level analysis to examine the assumptions of 
the second-order election model. Furthermore, it adds to existing research by 
analysing and comparing three sorts of elections. Despite the fact that local, 
regional and European elections are frequently analysed under the same 
framework of the second-order election model, few analyses have been conducted 
taking them simultaneously. 
Knowing the factors that correlate with ‘first-order thinking’ is not a trivial matter 
but essential for prescriptive reasons if we are interested in improving the way in 
which democracy works in multi-level systems of governance. If the results of a 
given election are determined by issues that are beyond the specific arena being 
contested, representatives would have few incentives to pursue voters’ preferences 
at that level. In that sense, subsequent research may focus on whether, as 
descriptive evidence shown here suggest, there are differences in terms of voting 
behaviour between those citizens that vote on the basis of level-specific issues and 
those who do not, moving from the causes to the possible consequences. 
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4.9 Appendix 
Description of the datasets (study number in parentheses) 
 
 European elections 
(state-wide) 
Regional elections 
(17 regions) 
Local elections 
(4 municipalities) 
1999 N=3,262 
(CIS 2325) 
  
2004 N=3,509 
(CIS 2564) 
  
2007  N=9,214
a 
(CIS 2707 to 2719) 
N=2,308 
(CIS 2720 to 2723) 
2009 N=3,493 
(CIS 2800) 
  
2011  N=15,444
a
 
(CIS 2870 to 2882) 
N=2,322 
(CIS 2866 to 2869) 
2012  N=4,802
b
 
(CIS 2939; 2963; 2964) 
 
2014 N=3,567 
(CIS 3022) 
  
2015  N=18,305
c
 
(CIS 3064 to 3076; 3108) 
N=2,295 
(CIS 3060 to 3063) 
Total N=13,831 N=47,765 N=6,925 
 
a
 13 ordinary regions 
b
 Andalusia, Galicia and Basque Country 
c
 13 ordinary regions and Catalonia 
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The transfer of powers from the national government downwards to local and 
regional authorities, and upwards to supra-national units entails the proliferation 
of elections at multiple levels of government in many countries. This has 
consequences for voters and parties. Voters are confronted with the task to elect 
not just national representatives, but also local, regional and, in the case of EU 
citizens, European ones. Parties need to meet the requirements of competition at 
different arenas simultaneously. 
Regardless of the many elections taking place at different levels of government, 
there is a tendency among political scientist to choose the national level as the unit 
of analysis (Jeffery and Schakel, 2013). This would not be an issue if what we 
know regarding the behaviour of voters and parties in general elections could be 
transferred without further considerations to elections taking place at upper or 
lower levels. In an ideal world, voters would be perfectly able to attribute political 
responsibilities and to hold representatives accountable for their actions in each 
level independently. And there would be no incentive for politicians to develop 
strategies of credit-claiming and blame-avoidance contributing to blur the 
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responsibilities of each jurisdiction. But in the real world, elections are not held in 
isolation one from another. 
According to the second-order election model, the only decisive elections are the 
national presidential or parliamentary ones (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). The rest are 
subordinated to them, in the sense that voters use sub-national and supra-national 
elections to reward or punish national governments not to express their 
preferences on level-specific issues. This raises concerns about how democracy 
works in multi-level states (Anderson 2006; Papadopoulos, 2007). Elections are 
the most essential mechanism to reward and punish representatives. Politicians 
pursue good policies once in office because they want to be re-elected. If citizens 
decide their vote on the basis of national issues, sub-national and supra-national 
politicians could diverge from their constituents’ preferences because their re-
election would not depend on their actions. This is especially relevant because the 
authority and powers of local, regional and European institutions are on the rise. 
Sub-national and supra-national authorities have an increasingly share of 
responsibility in important policy domains affecting the life of citizens. 
This dissertation contributes to a recently emerging wave of studies which 
challenge the inherent ‘methodological nationalism’ in comparative politics 
(Jeffery and Schakel, 2013), questioning the common assumption that 
developments at sub-national and supra-national elections in multi-level 
democracies are fundamentally driven by national-level factors. Both the supply- 
and the demand-side are analysed. The unit of analysis in the first and the second 
article of this dissertation are the parties, while the third article focuses on voters. 
In all of them, Spain constitutes the main case study, with one of the articles 
additionally looking at the case of United Kingdom. With regard to Spain, it has 
been said that this country ‘is a federation in all but name’ (Elazar, 1991: 227). 
Indeed, although legally it is a unitary state, Spain is considered to be ‘a de facto 
federal system’ (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 19). It has been characterized as a case 
of ‘federalism without formal federation’ (Erk 2004: 3), imperfect federalism 
(Moreno, 1994); non-institutional federalism (Colomer, 1998); incomplete 
federalism (Grau Creus, 2000); unfulfilled federalism (Beramendi and Maiz, 
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2004) or fully fledged federation (Sala, 2014). Spain has evolved from a hyper-
centralist state to a highly decentralized country in a relatively short period of 
time. The process of decentralization has not been uniform and there are big 
territorial disparities. Spanish regions cover all possible situations: there are 
regions with medium and with high levels of decentralization; regions that collect 
their own taxes; regions that followed the ‘fast-track’ or the ‘slow-track’ towards 
self-government; regions with and without regionalist parties; regions with 
different languages, history and culture; etc. Additionally, there is a high degree 
of autonomy at the local level. Elections to the European Parliament were 
introduced in 1987. Spain is, therefore, a good laboratory for scholars of territorial 
politics to test all kind of hypothesis, keeping constant country-level 
characteristics. At the same time, I believe that the results and lessons extracted 
mainly from the case of Spain, and to a lesser extent also from the British case, 
are likely to be applicable to other countries. Spain and United Kingdom stand out 
in some respects that might impair generalization. First, in both countries regional 
identity is strong and territorial issues are highly politicized. Second, these 
countries are characterized by the existence of electorally successful regionalist 
parties, that operate at various levels of government. Although these two 
characteristics are absent from a number of multi-level states, economic 
disparities or cultural differences between regions in the same country are likely 
to encourage the salience of the territorial cleavage. Regional branches of political 
parties may develop level-specific programmatic profiles, diverging from the 
positions and preferences of the national co-partisans. In what follows, I will 
describe the main general conclusions of the different contributions encompassing 
this dissertation. 
The repertoire of party strategies is wider and more versatile in multi-level states. 
The political space can be defined by, at least, two major dimensions of 
competition: a socioeconomic (left-right) and a territorial dimension (centre-
periphery). Political parties may choose both the saliency of each dimension and 
the position adopted. They have to decide if they want to compete in both 
dimensions simultaneously or only in their primary dimension, and whether to 
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ignore the issues belonging to the secondary dimension completely or to adopt an 
ambiguous position (Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber, 2015). 
The first article of this cumulative dissertation has shown that regionalist parties 
develop their strategies not only along their main dimension of competition, the 
centre-periphery dimension, as if they were niche parties. They also do so along 
the socioeconomic dimension, adopting a clear left-right position or very often 
remaining ambiguous and vague. On the other hand, state-wide parties, whose 
main dimension of competition is the socioeconomic one, incorporate territorial 
issues in their agenda, especially (but not exclusively) when they face the 
competition of regionalist parties. 
In multi-level countries, issue position and saliency are inevitably linked to one 
electoral arena. When preparing their campaigns, parties have to decide not just 
the position and saliency on the set of issues that conform a particular dimension 
of competition; they also have to decide the geographical – both vertical and 
horizontal – distribution of these positions and saliencies. Such distribution 
implies decisions about which issues and dimensions have to be emphasized in 
each electoral arena. One could expect parties emphasizing level-specific issues in 
each arena. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. 
The second research question addressed in this dissertation is precisely whether 
parties wilfully contaminate non-national elections with national issues in order to 
obtain electoral gains. The second article encompassing this dissertation makes a 
solid contribution to the analysis of contamination effects between electoral 
arenas in multi-level systems. The literature in this area has generally lacked a 
systematic account of the mechanism whereby there is variation across elections 
and regions in the extent to which national elections have an effect upon the 
electoral fate of sub-national politicians (Gschwend, 2008). Previous research has 
focused on voter’s capacity to distinguish competences across levels of 
governments. The second article contributes to advance this literature by 
proposing an additional mechanism to account for variation in the ‘contamination’ 
between electoral arenas, namely parties’ strategies aimed at nationalizing 
competition in regional elections. Evidence is provided on the fact that when the 
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economy is going well, regional branches of state-wide parties try to take credit of 
the popularity of the national co-partisans in office. In turn, the regional co-
partisans of the national opposition party emphasize national issues during 
regional election campaigns in times of economic downturn in order to transform 
regional elections into a plebiscite on the performance of the national incumbent 
party. 
Finally, the third article has shifted the focus from the parties to the voters, 
including local and European elections into the analysis. It is shown that while 
only a minority takes European issues into account during elections to the 
European Parliament, the majority of people report that local and regional issues 
determine their behaviour in local and regional elections, respectively. However, 
there are differences in ‘first-order thinking’ among individuals depending on 
their resources and political orientations. For instance, low-educated and 
unemployed people tend to consider issues that are specific to the arena being 
contested in sub-national and supra-national elections less often than those with 
high education or employment. 
In sum, political parties not only adapt to multi-level structures and strategize 
along the territorial dimension of competition. They can also play an active role in 
fostering the ‘contamination’ between electoral arenas. As long as they expect to 
earn electoral credit for that, they actively campaign in non-national elections 
stressing national-level issues. Nevertheless, the image of accountability just 
functioning at the national level does not mirror the reality of multi-level states. 
While it is true that knowledgeable voters seem to understand better the 
complexity of multi-level governance, local and regional elections are not 
comparable to elections to the European Parliament with regards to the proportion 
of citizens making their choices on the basis of national issues. 
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